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This dissertation represents my interpretation of the Southwest Detroit campaign for a 
community benefits agreement.  I do not intend to speak on behalf of the Delray community.  
Instead, my hope is that my readers will empathize with the residents of Delray and the members
of the Southwest Detroit Community Benefits Coalition, and perhaps even participate in efforts 
to change policy so that we no longer systematically build harmful developments in a way that 
unfairly burdens the most marginalized members of our society.
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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the nature of power in land use decisions that contribute to the
production of environmental inequality. By analyzing land use conflicts concerning who decides,
who profits, and who pays when it comes to the construction of urban infrastructure, I identify 
mechanisms that culminate in the disproportionate placement of hazardous facilities in low-
income communities of color. Specifically, by tracing decisions about the plant to build a new 
international border crossing in the Southwest Detroit neighborhood of Delray, I demonstrate 
how economic and political inequalities incentivize the placement of locally undesirable land 
uses (LULUs) in low-income, vulnerable communities. I examine three phases of the decision-
making process: the initial proposal regarding where to place the facility, the response by the 
host community, and the negotiation process involved in responding to the community’s 
concerns.
Drawing from fieldwork, interviews with residents, activists, and elected officials, and an
analysis of media coverage, I explain the emergence of the Southwest Detroit Community 
Benefits Coalition and why local stakeholders organized to conditionally support the new bridge,
rather than oppose it, despite fears about contamination and relocation. I argue that the campaign
for a community benefits agreement (CBA) resulted from a legacy of divestment and 
industrialization within the neighborhood, combined with the belief that residents lacked the 
political power to prevent the construction.  Thus, a “not-in-my-backyard” (NIMBY) campaign 
was effectively organized out of the political process, despite concerns about health impacts. 
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I then trace the community benefits campaign, illuminating mechanisms through which the 
Delray group was manipulated, tokenized, and silenced. 
Nearly all of the extant literature on CBAs draws its sample of cases from neighborhoods
that are in the process of or have successfully completed a CBA negotiation. No existing 
research has examined the power dynamics that shape a community’s ability to compel the 
developer to negotiate in the first place. By entering the community at an earlier policy-making 
state, I am able to demonstrate how political and economic inequalities contribute to 
environmental inequality. The dissertation closes with suggestions for how communities and 
policy-makers can more effectively prevent the reproduction of environmental injustice.
x
CHAPTER I
The Politics of Equitable Development
This dissertation examines the nature of power in land use decisions that contribute to the
production of environmental inequality.  By analyzing land use conflicts concerning who 
decides, who profits, and who pays when it comes to the construction of urban infrastructure, I 
identify mechanisms that culminate in the disproportionate placement of hazardous facilities 
within low-income communities of color.  I examine power dynamics during three phases of the 
decision-making process: the initial proposal regarding where to place the facility, the response 
by the host community, and the negotiation process involved in responding to the community’s 
concerns. 
Theories of Land Use Conflict
A primary theory in contemporary urban politics research is that the central policy issue 
for city leaders is economic development; this theory is known as “growth machine theory.”  
Following World War II, cities began to experience declines in their manufacturing bases and 
populations.  As property values fell and federal housing policy accelerated “white flight” to the 
suburbs (Sugrue, 2005), the percentage of lower-income, higher-need residents within central 
cities increased.  To combat their decline in revenue raised from taxes, growth interests—
composed of economic and political elites—collaborated to develop policies conducive to 
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business operations (Mollenkopf, 1989).  These growth coalitions, sometimes referred to as a 
city’s “growth machine” (Molotch, 1976) dominated city halls by pushing policy that would 
attract and retain capital.  They did this by both supporting “friendly” legislation and also 
influencing which political issues would be taken up and voted upon and which would be 
ignored.  Even when businesses groups did not lobby on issues explicitly, city leaders were 
conscious of capital’s profit requirements—and of their ability to exit (capital mobility)—so they
worked to continuously grow the city’s economy while retaining existing business. 
These growth coalitions have been particularly strong in the policy arena related to land 
use decisions. City officials and private corporations offer different tools for facilitating 
development, and a partnership can benefit both parties.  City officials, for example, can exercise
the power of eminent domain to assemble large parcels of land, give subsidies, provide zoning 
variances, build infrastructure, and offer assistance in the approval process for development 
projects.  Developers provide capital investment and can generate tax revenues and jobs through 
their projects.  
Another reason that city leaders seek to retain and grow capital is that cities are expected 
to provide services to their citizens, and they finance those activities mainly with revenue that 
they raise primarily through private, for-profit investment.  As a result, cities compete with each 
other to host affluent residents and corporations that pay more in taxes than they absorb in 
services.  This competition between cities for capital incentivizes city officials to provide 
favorable business environments. As a result, city leaders are reluctant to attach development 
requirements—such as local hiring programs or rules relating environmental regulations to local 
investment—because of the concern that added burdens to developers will scare off capital 
(Peterson, 1981), even if it means passing along negative externalities to host communities.  
Consequently, while development may profit economic elites, it may also lead to the 
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displacement of low-income residents through declines in public services, razing of buildings, or 
rising housing costs as a result of gentrification.  Nonetheless, public funding for development 
projects is frequently justified according to the rationale that these projects provide benefits for 
all members of the community.
The conflict between capital and community is most obviously expressed in disputes over
urban development. Following the basic Marxist distinction between “use value”—as the 
production of goods and services for one’s own use—and “exchange value”—as the production 
of goods and services for exchange with others, capital calculates the worth of cities according to
an exchange relationship, while residents view a city’s worth in terms of its usefulness in 
providing services, sustenance, and quality of life. Thus, capitalists support urban development 
that will further the use of commodities, land, and infrastructure toward making a profit, while 
citizens press for urban development that preserves urban land and infrastructure for their use 
and that supports their community (Mollenkopf, 1981). 
Regime theory, which emerged in the 1980s, is largely viewed as an extension, rather 
than a rejection, of growth machine theory (Logan, Whaley, & Crowder, 1997) in that it 
emphasizes the importance of informal but sustained relationships among local politicians and 
corporate actors who guide development and shifting coalitions connected to growth issues  
(Elkin, 1987; Stone, 1989). Thus, it argues that while pro-growth coalitions are still dominant in 
urban politics, the political balance between capital and cities varies based on the relative 
strength and interests of groups influencing development policies.  When the elite is fragmented, 
there is a political opportunity for residents to pursue “use” value (Elkin, 1987; Stone, 1989).
Later work on resistance to urban development predicted that poor and minority 
communities would have a more difficult time influencing development because they are 
comparably weak institutionally and the organizations that defend them might be susceptible to 
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cooptation (Logan & Molotch, 2007). Similarly, Clark and Goetz found that antigrowth 
movements (those characterized as NIMBY, or “not in my backyard”) are more likely to emerge 
in areas where residents have higher levels of education, income, and professional occupations.  
Thus, economic development can exacerbate socio-economic inequality within cities, since 
capital profits from new projects while the poor and people of color disproportionately pay the 
associated costs (Storey & Hamilton, 2003).
Community Resistance
Despite the primacy of business interests aligning with political leadership, the local state
is not completely free to support capital’s growth agenda while ignoring the citizenry (Elkin, 
1987; Stone, 1989), and communities are not simply passive recipients of unwanted 
development. The term “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) is used to describe general opposition to 
the siting of locally undesirable land uses (LULUs) (Luloff, Albrecht, & Bourke, 1998). Suttles 
(1972) referred to such communities—in which opposition to unwanted development is strong—
as "defended neighborhoods." 
In their book on the development of “megaprojects,” Altschuler and Luberoff 
documented how, in some cases, NIMBY opposition forced modifications and even 
cancellations of major infrastructure projects (Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003).  Additional examples
of citizens “defending” their neighborhoods include cancellations of urban renewal projects 
(Medoff & Sklar, 1994; Stoecker, 2010), highways, (Gotham, 1999; Gregory, 1999), airports 
(Flores Dewey & Davis, 2013), heavy industries (Almeida & Stearns, 1998; Checker, 2005; 
Pulido, 1996), and waste facilities (Pellow, 2004; Sze, 2007). 
For example, Gotham (1999) documented efforts to build a new interstate through 
predominately black neighborhoods in Kansas City.  The freeway was pitched as the “most 
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efficient route” to support trade “from the Gulf to Canada” and to bring new jobs and suburban 
development. The Kansas City Mayor at the time described it as “inevitable.”  Yet the impacted, 
predominately Black host community organized to halt further property acquisition.  Residents 
allied with the NAACP and other Civil Rights Movement organizations, charging that the new 
plan would have the effect of “destabilizing schools, blighting neighborhoods, and following 
racially discriminatory relocation activities” (Gotham, 1999, p. 339).  Gotham argues that 
residents were able to reframe the highway proposal from a rational and objective transportation 
plan to one that would destroy black communities by segregating them, stealing property, 
isolating them, and creating a wall, while benefitting (white) suburbanites.
Likewise, in his book Defended Community, Stoecker tells the story of a Minneapolis 
community slated for total demolition and documents its resistance to new development, 
including the implementation of a community-controlled redevelopment plan that included a 
rigid “no-displacement” policy (Stoecker, 2010).  
In contrast to those cases of successful resistance, it is also necessary to emphasize that 
urban scholars have demonstrated that awareness of an outside threat is not a sufficient condition
to generated an organized citizen defense of a neighborhood.  Gans, in his classic work The 
Urban Villagers (1982), conducted an ethnographic study while living in Boston’s West End 
neighborhood. During his residency, the neighborhood was slated for “slum clearance” as part of
a federally supported attempt to improve city conditions through “urban renewal.”  Gans 
documented that residents did not actively resist urban renewal plans until it was too late (Gans, 
1982).  
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Connecting Equitable Development and Environmental Justice
Questions concerning who profits and who pays relating to land use policy and 
development are central to the analysis of both urban development and environmental justice.  
Since the late 1980s, scholars, policy-makers, and activists have documented the widespread 
placement of LULUs within low-income communities of color (Bryant, 1995; Bullard, 1993; 
Mohai & Bryant, 1992).  In addition to being more likely to host LULUs, neighborhoods where 
residents are mainly poor and people of color are regulated differently than more affluent, whiter 
areas.  When fines are levied against polluting industries areas based upon hazardous waste laws,
it is more likely to happen in predominately white or affluent areas. Moreover, such penalties 
were about 500 percent higher at sites having the greatest percentage of white population than 
penalties at sites with the greatest percentage of minority population (Lavelle & Coyle, 1992).  In
addition, a National Law Journal investigation discovered that in minority areas, it took 20 
percent longer to put hazardous waste sites on the Environmental Protection Agency national 
priority list than it did in white areas (Lavelle & Coyle, 1992).  The investigation concludes: 
“There is a racial divide in the way the U.S. government cleans up toxic waste sites and punishes
polluters. White communities see fast action, better results and stiffer penalties than communities
where Blacks, Hispanics and other minorities live. This unequal protection often occurs whether 
the community is wealthy or poor” (Lavelle & Coyle, 1992).
Environmental justice concerns include the disproportionate placement of undesirable 
land uses in areas where residents are poor and people of color.  In addition, environmental 
justice advocates seek a fair and inclusive process relating to land use decisions.  
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency defines environmental justice as: 
The fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, 
national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation and 
enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies. Fair treatment means that 
no group of people, including racial, ethnic, or socioeconomic groups should bear a 
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disproportionate share of the negative environmental consequences resulting from 
industrial, municipal, and commercial operations, or the execution of federal, state, local, 
and tribal programs and policies. (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1998)
The term environmental racism refers to a similar concept. Coined by Reverend Dr. Benjamin F. 
Chavis Jr., a former executive director of the National Association for the Advancement of 
People of Color (NAACP), environmental racism is defined as “racial discrimination in 
environmental policy-making, enforcement of regulations and laws, and the deliberate targeting 
of communities of color for toxic waste disposal and the siting of polluting industries” (Chavis, 
1993).  
Ninety-four percent of the twenty-three thousand largest polluting facilities release their 
pollutants on site into the air, water, and soil. Thus citizens who work and reside in the areas in 
which these facilities are located typically experience much greater rates of exposure to 
industrial pollutants (Faber & Krieg, 2002, p. 282).  A number of terms have been used to 
describe the areas where people live near severe contamination: “environmental high-impact 
areas,” “fence line communities,” and “hot spots.” Like Lerner (2010), I use the term sacrifice 
zones because it dramatizes the fact that when we spatially concentrate LULUs, we “sacrifice” 
the health of the environment and its residents, at times justifying that decision as one that 
benefits “the greater good.”  Typically, sacrifice zones are geographically isolated—the type of 
neighborhood that you do not go to unless you live or work there.  They are easy to ignore, and 
their residents are often politically and economically marginalized.  Thus, the health of people 
who live in highly industrialized areas is not protected to the same degree as that of citizens who 
can afford to live in exclusively residential neighborhoods (Lerner, 2010, p. 6).
Social determinants of health are factors in the social environment that contribute to, or 
detract from, the health of individuals and communities. Such factors include SES, 
transportation, housing, access to services, discrimination by social grouping, and social or 
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environmental stressors.  Inequitable distribution of these conditions across various populations 
is a significant contributor to persistent and pervasive health disparities in the U.S. 
Numerous studies have demonstrated the unequal chemical exposure burden suffered by 
many low-income and heavily minority communities (Bryant, 1995; Bullard, 1993; Mohai & 
Bryant, 1992). Public health researchers use the term environmental health disparities to 
describe health inequalities that are determined, in part, by exposure to contamination (Gee & 
Payne-Sturges, 2004).   For example, people who live close to major highways often suffer 
disproportionately from respiratory problems (Srinivasan, O'Fallon, & Dearry, 2003).
Environmental inequality is inextricably tied to deep-seated patterns of racial and 
economic segregation. When different stakeholders struggle for access to valuable resources, the 
benefits and costs of those resources are distributed unevenly.  Those who are least able to 
mobilize resources will most likely bear the brunt of environmental harm.  These hazards have 
an effect on the health of communities. Conversely, those with the greatest access to valuable 
resources will enjoy cleaner and safer places to live, work, and play. As New York City’s master 
planner Robert Moses said, when it comes to the placement of undesirable land uses, “You can’t 
make an omelet without breaking some eggs” (Caro, 1974).
The Intervention: Community Benefits Agreements 
For some environmentalists, the solution to contamination and environmental health 
impacts is to close toxic industries or to prevent their construction (a NIMBY approach).  Yet, 
particularly in impoverished communities, many residents view these calls as threats to their jobs
and livelihood, especially when they are not included in related decision-making processes.
 Furthermore, there are land uses such as waste, energy, and clean water plants that need to go 
somewhere.  Are there ways to mitigate the harm associated with these LULUs and perhaps 
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event to augment their benefits to the host community?  Is there a way to allow for urban 
development that does not burden host communities by “sacrificing” their land, air, water, and 
health?
Community Benefits Agreements (CBAs) are private contracts negotiated between a 
developer and a community coalition that aim to mitigate harm associated with urban 
development while sharing the benefits of any anticipated positive outcomes with existing 
residents of the host community (Baxamusa, 2008; Gross, 2008; Gross, LeRoy, & Janis-
Aparicio, 2002; Janis, 2007; Larsen, 2009; LeRoy, 2009; Parks & Warren, 2009; Salkin & 
Lavine, 2008).  They result from a bargain in which the community coalition typically agrees to 
support the new development, thereby offering the developer increased assurances that public 
review processes will be expedited.  In exchange, the developer agrees to a set of investments 
(“community benefits”) that can include anything from environmental protections, to 
investments in local schools or affordable housing, to access to clear and timely information and 
local accountability relating to the project.
Advocates of CBAs have been careful to define them clearly because local government 
officials and developers may use the term “community benefits agreement” to describe any set of
community benefits commitments on which they agree.  Julian Gross, a lawyer who has 
negotiated several CBAs, defines them as “legally binding contracts (or set of related contracts), 
setting forth a range of community benefits regarding a development project, and resulting from 
substantial community involvement” (Gross, 2008, p. 3).  His definition emphasizes that 
accountability and citizen leadership are crucial to a true CBA, which goes beyond mere 
developer concessions.  Parks and Warren, two social work scholars at the University of 
Chicago, later built upon Gross’s definition.  They define CBAs as:
Legally binding agreements between a private developer or governmental body and a 
coalition of community-based organizations, labor unions, environmentalists, and other 
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advocacy groups.  In an agreement, community members pledge their support for a 
development in return for tangible benefits such as living wage jobs, local hiring 
agreements, and green building practices, funds for parks, affordable housing, and 
childcare. (Parks & Warren, 2009)
Their definition also emphasizes accountability and citizen inclusion.  However, they add that an 
agreement is not a CBA unless it includes “tangible benefits,” as well as a range of community 
interests. As Gross warns, the definition matters. Indeed, without a precise definition—one that 
includes accountability, citizen inclusion, and tangible benefits—a CBA could be used simply as 
a convenient term for any commitment to a community or, to put it less charitably, as a project 
proponents hope will fill the political space a community-driven CBA campaign would have 
occupied, thus easing project approval and marginalizing opposition (Gross, 2008, p. 37)
The Scope of Community Benefits Agreements
The CBA movement was born in the late 1990s as a mechanism for community groups to
organize and work collaboratively to communicate and negotiate directly with developers 
(Gross, 2008; Gross et al., 2002). Since then, CBA campaigns have become increasingly visible 
across the country and have been signed in association with the development or expansion of 
airports, various baseball and basketball stadiums, universities, and housing developments 
(Mulligan-Hansel & LeRoy, 2008). A 2008 study identified more than 50 CBAs that had been 
implemented in response to proposed large development projects in the United States (Salkin & 
Lavine, 2008). CBAs are present in 10 cities, which means some cities have more than one CBA 
(Dreier, 2009).  In my review of the literature, I did not come across any examples of community
groups that had attempted to secure a CBA and had been unsuccessful in doing so—an empirical 
gap to which I will return later. 
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It is hard to predict whether the use of CBAs will increase in the future.  For one thing, 
they are controversial.  Some critics note that there are already safeguards and protections 
associated with new development.  Others believe that almost any economic development is 
good development, in the sense that it can build a city’s tax base and provide jobs.  From that 
perspective, everyone gains from new development, and there is no reason to distribute capital to
the host community, or, for that matter, anyone else burdened by the new development.  CBAs 
have also been described as a form of extortion perpetuated by special-interest groups against 
developers. 
CBAs have been critiqued as well. Some CBAs have been characterized as a bribe given 
by developers to community groups for their support (Wolf-Powers, 2012) particularly when 
investments involve issues that are not directly related to the project (Been, 2010).  Yet some 
CBA advocates argue that their strength lies precisely in their flexibility and praise their ability 
to address issues beyond the specific project.  For example, Lucas-Darby describes CBAs as a 
form of “environmental reparations” for historical and current damages to neighborhoods 
through redevelopment (Lucas-Darby, 2012).
The CBA Negotiation Process
Baxamusa (2008) presented the following description of the CBA negotiation process 
based upon data that he collected from two case studies, which was supplemented by research on
other CBAs. He identified eight steps to secure a meaningful CBA:
(1) Formation of the CBA Coalition  
(2) Initiation of a CBA negotiation 
(3) Selection of negotiating team, leaders, and moderators 
(4) Proposals and counter proposals 
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(5) Caucus and time out 
(6) Data gathering during negotiations 
(7) Check with public development agency and planners
(8) Signing and enforcements
I outline these steps in greater detail below.  
A host community is more likely to achieve a meaningful CBA when its stakeholders are 
mobilized and organized.  At their core, CBAs are political outcomes; as such, they rely first and 
foremost on the organizing power of the community for their emergence, implementation, and 
enforcement.  Strong CBAs result from carefully crafted organizing strategies that bring together
community and labor constituencies with overlapping interests and that engage both “insider” 
and “outsider” tactics (Luce, 2004). The first step, then, is to form a CBA coalition, which 
requires grassroots organizing (Haas, 2002; Leavitt, 2006; Parks & Warren, 2009; Salkin & 
Lavine, 2007). CBA groups generally comprise numerous community groups which must first 
deliberate among themselves before approaching a developer (Baxamusa, 2008).    
The second step is to begin the CBA negotiation process. Negotiation during the approval 
process is the one time that community organizations have leverage; once the project is 
approved, that leverage disappears (Gross et al., 2002).  This step requires compelling the 
developer to come to the bargaining table and then to negotiate.  There is an important question 
here: why would a developer want to come to the negotiation table, especially if signing a CBA 
requires financial investments that cut into the profit of a project?  Developers are largely 
motivated to negotiate when they believe that doing so will be more profitable or efficient than 
not doing so; the CBA thus serves as a “risk mitigation exercise.”  Indeed, developers understand
that NIMBY movements are a frequent feature of the urban landscape.  They know that it is 
possible to be engulfed in protracted legal battles against opponents of a controversial project 
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(Frug, 2001; Popper, 1991).Those legal battles—or even the possibility that a legal battle may 
emerge—have contributed to the costs associated with development and developers’ insecurity.  
Thus, there are planners and developers with a “politically astute awareness of resistance” 
(Sanyal, 2005) who reach out to potential protesters to implement a planning process that is 
deemed fair and open to all affected groups, even if the gesture turns out only to be symbolic.  
By reaching out, they aim to reduce the likelihood of opposition and to remove any uncertainty 
associated with the project (Baxamusa, 2008). One such example is economist Jack Kyser, 
who as vice president of the private Los Angeles County Economic Development Corp., is 
the closest thing the city has to a business community spokesperson, and is no fan of living-
wage ordinances or, more generally, increased regulations on business. He has kind words, 
though, for CBAs, which, he believes, often ‘defuse the opposition to very high-profile 
projects. Purists may say this is not the best way to go. But if you want to get something 
built, especially in an area as contentious as L.A. can be, it's a good way to go. You get your
project, and everybody benefits’. (Meyerson, 2006)
In sum, CBAs may be the most cost-effective route for developers to expedite their projects, 
particularly in contrast to other means used within the public approval process.  
 In the third step, the CBA team selects its leadership, deciding who should represent 
impacted groups, including both residents and business owners. In order to be fully 
representative, organizers must seek out community members and community preferences.  This 
process may include going door to door, conducting surveys, or speaking with already-
established groups and holding public meetings.  In addition, empirical studies of CBAs have 
emphasized the importance of allying with organized labor (Wolf-Powers, 2012). 
At the fourth stage, there are proposals and counter proposals.  Again, this requires 
leverage with the developer as well as the ability to negotiate within the coalition. For a broad-
based coalition, this stage may be the hardest. Different community groups have varying agendas
with different needs and requests.  Moreover, as Laing points out, additional challenges may 
emerge when differences of opinion reflect racial or class dynamics (Laing, 2009).  One way to 
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overcome those challenges is to assess the overall needs of the coalition, including a survey of 
what the coalition brings to the table and what is needed from the developers. Some negotiating 
teams create a “CBC Operating Agreement” to define membership and procedures for dealing 
with conflicts of interest, as well as to address other coalition issues. 
In a similar vein, the fifth step is that the negotiation team takes time to caucus and to be 
accountable to its constituent groups.  In some cases, representatives may disingenuously bargain
on behalf of narrow interests while publicly stating that they represent the interests of the broader
community.  Thus, the coalition must communicate its efforts to community members, union 
members, and the general public in order to mobilize support (Laing, 2009).  
Baxamusa presents the sixth step as data gathering.  This step may require accessing 
technical information about the impacts of the project or the value of proposed mediation 
measures.  In some cases, technical reports are highly specialized and may necessitate help from 
experts such as lawyers, engineers, or urban planners. 
The seventh stage requires both the community coalition and the developer to ensure that 
agreed upon CBA provisions are within the city’s regulatory framework.  The development 
agency will need to ensure that the development and CBA process are legal.  Questions may 
emerge about the legality of zoning or public participation processes, for example.  
In the eighth and final stage, there is a signed CBA with guaranteed enforcement 
measures.  To effectively reach this final stage, the community needs to be able to hold its 
coalition together both during the negotiating of the CBA and after the project’s completion so as
to ensure that promises made by the developer are honored after the project has been finished 
(Simmons & Luce, 2009).  It may be difficult to sustain the energy to monitor and enforce the 
CBA.  Some coalitions have worked to resolve this problem by “requiring the developer to set 
aside seed money for the maintenance of a coalition… However, conflicts of interest (perceived 
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or actual) may arise if the developer funds enforcement efforts and inadequate assurances of 
independence are made” (Salkin & Lavine, 2008).
In sum, all seven steps require community power and leverage, which only emerge from 
the right context and through strong organizing practices.  The “right” context has typically 
included strong unions, organized neighborhoods, and progressive city councils; CBAs first 
appeared in cities with those elements in place.  In fact, organized labor and supportive local 
government have been found to be critical in negotiating, implementing, and enforcing CBAs, 
particularly when public subsidies or public land is required to complete the project (Wolf-
Powers, 2010, 2012).   The community coalition is also stronger when the developer is 
constrained by some feature of the landscape and when the local real estate market is strong 
(Cain, 2014; Parks & Warren, 2009).  In addition, CBAs require good timing.  CBAs are more 
likely to be signed when local coalitions are able to impede or delay the approval of projects 
(Larsen, 2009; Salkin & Lavine, 2008)
Strong organizing practices include strategies that require social action and community 
mobilization tactics in conjunction with research and community development expertise (Sites, 
2007). Thus, success emerges from more than just a strong will and is most likely in cases where 
the various groups involved can be effectively organized to ally and work together toward a clear
set of goals.  
Empirical Gaps 
To understand the politics of equitable development, including the nature of power within
land use decision-making, we must remember that there are at least seven steps that are 
necessary to secure a CBA.  However, most of the empirical research on CBAs solely evaluates 
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their processes at the time of negotiation or the outcomes after an agreement is secured.  As such,
I suggest that the research reflects two important empirical gaps, both of which relate to timing. 
First, the literature tends to take the community’s goal of securing a CBA for granted, 
assuming that communities are willing to tolerate what is typically considered undesirable 
development. In doing so, it neglects to consider why some communities desire – or are at least 
willing to tolerate – what are typically conceptualized as locally undesirable developments.  To 
better understand why a community might conditionally endorse a LULU, rather than pursuing 
an oppositional, not-in-my-backyard strategy, it is necessary to analyze goal setting within the 
impacted community once it has been selected to host the LULU.  This analytic strategy matters 
because of the way it highlights the different factors that lead to pursuing an oppositional-
NIMBY strategy versus a collaborative-CBA strategy. The differences in these two strategies 
could reflect a community’s perception of its own power: of what it perceives to be a viable and 
achievable goal rather than a true, but unachievable, preference. It demonstrates why impacted 
residents, at times, appear complicit in supporting developments that will dismantle their 
communities, harm their surrounding environment, and ultimately hurt the health and wellbeing 
of their families and neighbors. In turn, these decisions reveal an important way in which some 
political issues are actually organized outside of the political arena.   
Second, because existing empirical evaluations of CBAs nearly exclusively draw their 
sample from communities at the time of negotiation or implementation, they effectively ignore 
the communities that cannot get the developer to the negotiation table in the first place.  It is not 
in a developer’s interests to cut her profits by investing in the surrounding community.  Thus, she
will likely resist signing a CBA unless the community can offer something in exchange. And 
because the least powerful communities are also the least likely to incentivize negotiations, I 
argue that the extant body of literature reflects a truncated, biased sample.  
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In other words, if we consider the universe of communities that could host new 
development, we know that public and private developers are comparatively more likely to 
propose to place LULUs in low-income communities of color than in whiter, more affluent areas.
In this context, the extant literature on CBAs samples the subset of communities that are both 
selected to host a LULU and powerful enough to compel a developer to negotiate, a relatively 
small subset. 
One of the most common critiques of case study methods is that they are particularly 
prone to versions of “selection bias” (Geddes, 1990).  Selection bias can occur when the 
researcher unwittingly selects cases that represent a truncated sample along the dependent 
variable of the relevant population of cases (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994).  
Thus, while the existing empirical findings of these earlier studies would hold, if it is true
that the literature represents a truncated sample that has consistent characteristics, it would be 
necessary to (1) nuance our interpretation of these findings and (2) examine CBA campaigns in 
which communities cannot compel the developer to negotiate.  For example, the optimism that 
many researchers have about the strength of CBAs would need to be questioned, since we have 
only been sampling neighborhoods that are successful.  After all, a policy is no good if the 
communities that need it cannot access it – and they cannot access it if it is removed from the 
negotiation table (or if they never even make it to the table in the first place).  The study of 
power needs to include the non-decisions that are made when contentious policy issues are 
avoided or sidelined rather than subjected to obvious and observable challenge: not only what 
was done, but also what was not done – and why (Crenson, 1971; Schattschneider, 1960).  
The Study of Non-Decisions
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To shed light on the nature of power in urban land use decision-making, I begin my 
analysis of CBA negotiations at an earlier time point.  Rather than evaluating power dynamics 
within the negotiation or the implementation of the CBA, I begin by touching on the factors that 
influenced the decision of where to place a locally undesirable land use, focusing on race and 
class.  Second, I examine why the impacted neighborhood opted to pursue a CBA campaign 
rather than a NIMBY campaign.  Finally, I explore the actors who effectively blocked the 
impacted neighborhood’s ability to secure a CBA, at least thus far. By analyzing both decisions 
and  “non-decisions” that were made in relation to the placement of the LULU, the community 
response to the proposal, and the process of resistance, I am able to construct a broader story 
about the relationship between economic and racial inequalities and environmental inequalities.
The approach I take here honors the call from political scientists and sociologists who, in 
their efforts to understand the nature of power and decision-making within cities, have 
emphasized the need to examine why some policy issues are avoided or sidelined rather than 
subjected to obvious and observable challenge.  Rather than assuming that some policy issues do 
not emerge because there is simply no discontent or—if there is discontent—that it represents 
one of countless dissatisfactions that divert citizens from registering their complaints (Dahl, 
2005), I suggest that a form of power is the ability to shape political agendas.  Bachrach and 
Baratz (1962) call the ability to prevent grievances from entering the political arena the “second 
face of power.”  Thus, “non-decision-makers” are “people whose political power consists in their
ability to prevent the consideration of some kinds of issues” (Crenson, 1971, p. 21).  By 
restricting the scope of the political process, some issues are organized into politics, while others 
are organized out (Schattschneider, 1960).  By studying the CBA process, including which issues
are organized into politics and which are organized out, I am able to investigate the openness of 
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urban land use politics, that is, the degree to which those in power are able “to prevent the 
consideration of some kinds of issues.”  
Furthermore, the study of “non-decisions” helps to avoid selection bias.  As explained by 
Kristin Goss in her book Disarmed: The Missing Movement for Gun Control in America:  
By studying only movements that have happened, we risk misunderstanding the causal 
processes behind those movements.  There are two possible sources of error. First, by 
focusing only on positive cases, we risk attributing causal significance to factors that 
were merely correlates (thereby upwardly biasing those factors’ importance.) Second, and
conversely, we risk overlooking variables that are in fact important.  Only by studying 
“non-movements” can we hope to produce valid causal models. (Goss, 2010) 
In the case of CBA campaigns, if one considers a CBA as the dependent variable, then the 
“universe” of cases that have been examined thus far is truncated because of a systematic error.  
Specifically, nearly every CBA study that I am aware of that has evaluated CBAs has done so 
during or after the time of negotiation.  The variance of the DV is thus the “strength of the 
CBA.”  However, as I noted above, this method ignores communities that do not get to the 
negotiation table in the first place.  For example, there are communities that would not pursue a 
CBA at all, perhaps because they perceive the new development as an issue to be resisted. And 
there are neighborhoods that are unable to get to the policy negotiation table and are thus 
prevented from working in favor of their own interests. And finally there are communities that 
may get to the negotiation table but are unable to gain concessions.  This study makes an 
important addition to existing literature because I “entered” the CBA-negotiation process at an 
earlier time than other researchers, and as a result, I am able to examine a case that would 
otherwise be considered a “non-event” or non-decision.  
Research Design
I conducted a political ethnographic examination of the Southwest Detroit Community 
Benefits Coalition (CBC) and its campaign for a CBA in exchange for hosting a new 
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international border crossing.1  In September 2011, I presented my research project to the CBC 
Board, formally asking for permission to follow their campaign.  A motion to support my 
research by allowing access to their work was passed unanimously. 
My research involved several types of data: participant observation (2011 – 2014), formal
and informal interviews, and a review of organizational documents. I observed nearly every CBC
public meeting, board meeting, and membership event during that period (n=58).  In April of 
2011, I received IRB approval for my project. I also observed public hearings relating to the 
NITC and/or Community Benefits at the State Senate Economic Development Committee 
(n=10), State House Transportation Committee, Detroit City Council Meeting, and public 
debates. I traveled with CBC members to the State Capitol or to City Hall when they went to 
lobby or give testimony, thus allowing me to observe strategic planning on the trip up and 
debriefing on the way back.
In addition to observing the CBC, I participated in their work by assisting their board and
staff by conducting research, contacting members through phone calls and door-to-door 
canvassing, and coordinating volunteers. During the three-year study, I frequently spent time 
informally in Southwest Detroit with CBC members doing what political scientist Richard Fenno
described as “soaking and poking” (Fenno, 1978; Schatz, 2009).  Within informal settings, I 
listened and observed as members interpreted recent events, made sense of new or conflicting 
information, strategized for the future, or went about the work of building an organization (K. C. 
Walsh, 2009).
1 Note that under Democratic Michigan Governor Jennifer Granholm, the new bridge was called 
“The Detroit River International Crossing” or the “DRIC”.  In 2012, when Republican Governor 
Rick Snyder took office, the proposed bridge was re-branded and given the name the “New 
International Trade Crossing” or NITC.  In this dissertation, I refer to it as the NITC because that
is the name that corresponded with my fieldwork.  In 2015, however, the bridge was given a new
name by both the United States and Canada: The Gordie Howe International Bridge.
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In 2013, I moved to Southwest Detroit and rented an office in the neighborhood.  
Although this move took place toward the end of my formal data collection period, I was able to 
gain in my understanding of what it is like to live near a border crossing.  This move also 
occurred during the time period in which the City of Detroit declared bankruptcy.  By spending 
more time informally in Southwest Detroit, I was able to seek out the spaces where my study’s 
participants engage in “real” interactions (Ocejo, 2012).
It is important to note that I had some prior experience working in Southwest Detroit 
before 2011.  In 2003, as a student of community organization in the University of Michigan 
Masters of Social Work program under the guidance of Lorraine Gutiérrez, I held an internship 
that was based in the Southwest Detroit neighborhood of Mexicantown, the neighborhood that 
borders where the new bridge was proposed to land.  Mexicantown is also the home of an 
existing international border crossing, the Ambassador Bridge. During my internship, I partnered
with Mexicantown stakeholders and elected officials to establish a new community organization,
“Bridgewatch Detroit.”  Our mission was to educate residents about the health impacts of diesel 
emissions, to reduce the number of trucks on local streets, and to protect neighborhood homes 
and businesses from encroachment by the Ambassador Bridge. When I returned in 2011 to begin 
my fieldwork, I was welcomed back by several familiar faces.  They served as guides for me to 
meet Delray stakeholders and vouched for me as a trustworthy person.  Furthermore, I was 
already familiar with many of the concerns and dilemmas faced by border communities.
In addition to participant observation, I conducted in-depth interviews (n=77) with 
residents, lobbyists, and elected officials to understand why Delray was chosen to host the new 
crossing, how the community responded to the proposal, and finally the nature of power 
dynamics within the CBA campaign.  Notably, I conducted a minimum of one in-depth interview
with nearly all of the CBC’s fourteen Board Members and six of its at-large members, as well as 
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key elected officials, including the Lieutenant Governor, who—along with the Governor—was 
“championing” the new bridge at the time. I interviewed Delray’s State Representative, State 
Senator, and six of the seven members of the State Senate Economic Development Committee, 
the committee in which the bridge was debated for nine months in 2011.  I interviewed 
community activists who live and work near the Windsor side of the bridge, as well as journalists
who have covered this story for years.  When I could not interview a respondent, I drew from 
texts in the media such as editorials or interviews. For more information about my respondents, 
please see Appendix.
I triangulated my original data collection (through direct observation and interviews) with
a combination of mass-mediated documents and official documents related to the selection of the
host site, such as the project’s Environmental Impact Statement.  I reviewed mass-mediated 
information including every newspaper article or blog containing the word “Delray” and/or 
“New International Trade Crossing” (as identified using Google alerts) between 2011 and 2014.  
My analysis involved a combination of inductive and deductive approaches to my data.  
Originally, I developed most of my questions based on my personal experience as a community 
organizer, as well as on academic and practice literatures relating to community organizing, 
urban politics, and civic participation.  Over time, my research questions—and thus my 
analytical codes—evolved as I immersed myself in the case. 
In my first iteration of coding, I simply coded in a descriptive manner for (1) stakeholders
and (2) frames.  I constructed a dataset with every stakeholder that I observed or that was quoted 
in the media in relation to the CBC.  This included community members; political leaders at 
local, state, and federal levels; bureaucrats; lobbyists; and more—and on both sides of the 
border. This quickly became unwieldy, although it was helpful for clarifying relevant actors and 
their interests.  
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In my second iteration of coding, I tried to streamline my process.  This time, I only 
coded for “Delray / CBC Allies,” “Delray / CBC Opponents,” “CBC Target / Decision-maker,” 
and “Within Group Dynamics,” with sub-codes of leadership development and membership 
recruitment.  However, as I analyzed them to look for patterns, I noticed many seemingly 
contradictory instances in which CBC members expressed concerns about the NITC, but 
identified pro-NITC actors as allies. This created an empirical puzzle: Why wasn’t the CBC 
allying with opponents of the NITC to oppose it and, as such, pursuing a NIMBY campaign?  
This new question contributed to a need for a third round of coding.
In my third iteration of coding, I began to note “strategic decisions,” particularly those 
made by the CBC.  I created several new codes including: “history of the NITC project,” to 
understand why Delray was chosen as the host site; “history of Delray,” to understand what, if 
any, previous community campaigns influenced the strategy of the CBC; “goal selection,” to 
understand the factors that gave rise to the CBA campaign; “strategy selection,” to understand 
decisions relating to tactics and messaging; and finally “the process of negotiation” to tease out 
relevant decision-makers and non-decision-makers.
In all three rounds of coding, I included the codes “Good Quotes” and “I don’t know how
to code this” for things that were particularly surprising or that provoked an emotional reaction.  
I also added a code for “relating to my research methodology” because some day I hope to write 
about ethical dilemmas within community engaged research, as well as about managing a 
research team.  
After completing my coding, I read through all of my excerpts to either construct a 
timeline or to pull out themes or identify contradictions.  This read-through led either to 
additional interviews or the development of research memos.  The culmination of that work is 
this dissertation.
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Outline of the dissertation
Chapter Two, “The Business of Borders,” introduces the case study, including a history 
of the proposed New International Trade Crossing (NITC). It includes an analysis of the political
actors that influenced political decisions relating to the new crossing.  It concludes with an 
analysis of why Delray was identified to host the new crossing, thereby identifying mechanisms 
through which political and economic inequality shape to environmental inequality.
Chapter Three, “From NIMBY to Negotiation: Deciding to Pursue a Community Benefits
Agreement,” examines the power dynamics that contributed to the decision to pursue a CBA 
campaign, rather than a NIMBY campaign.  It demonstrates how community political power was
constrained, in part, because Delray stakeholders opted to frame their demands in a manner that 
would put them in alliance with some actors and not others.  In so doing, the Delray stakeholders
chose to articulate a moderated demand that, at times, led them to appear complicit in the 
destruction of their community.
Chapter Four, “Access Denied: Obstacles to Community Benefits Agreements,” lays out 
a new framework identifying categories of “gatekeepers” who (at times unintentionally) 
undermined the CBC from securing a CBA.
Chapter Five concludes that the power dynamics woven throughout the Delray campaign,
beginning the decision to place the crossing in Delray, resulted in growing health disparities and 
the reproduction of an environmental sacrifice zone.  In this chapter, I argue that these power 
dynamics reveal the insidious way in which some topics never become political issues, thereby 
rendering marginalized groups at times politically invisible. 
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Figure 1. Data Collection – Participant Observation.  The Southwest Detroit Community 
Benefits Coalition and me, in front of the state capitol in Lansing, Michigan. (Source: Xhensila 
(Janie) Velencia)
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Figure 2 - Data Collection – Interviews.  Reporters interviewing the president of the 
Community Benefits Coalition on the day that the New Internation Trade Agreement was signed 
between Michigan Governer Rick Snyder and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper. 
Members of the Community Benefits Coalition, as well as organized labor, stand with signs in 
the background. I am in the foreground, standing with the reporters. (Source: Sian Dowis)
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Chapter II
The Business of Borders
In this chapter, I introduce the case of the Southwest Detroit neighborhood of Delray, 
where a border crossing, the New International Trade Crossing (NITC), is proposed to land.  The
chapter proceeds in three parts.  It begins by introducing the low-income, highly industrialized 
neighborhood of Delray by detailing its historical relationships with the Detroit River, 
transportation, and industry. It demonstrates that the demise of the neighborhood was brought on 
by a combination of low-income people occupying a site that was attractive to industrialists and 
the city’s growth regime, in conjunction with a reduction in city services. 
Next, I explain the rise of a coalition—composed of multinational companies and the 
Canadian federal government—that pushed for a new trade route between the United States and 
Canada.  This section also introduces the opposition to this proposed crossing: a billionaire 
family that owns the largest and most profitable border crossing in North America.  It then 
summarizes the timeline and tactics involved in the political fight over the NITC.  
Finally, I conclude the chapter by describing factors that shaped the decision of a bi-
national group of Canadian and American elected officials and transportation bureaucrats to 
build the new crossing in Delray, instead of another location.  I demonstrate how justifications 
were linked with a lack of political power (other areas were better equipped to mount an 
effective NIMBY campaign), a lack of economic power (Delray had the cheapest land), and even
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a contaminated environment (the bridge could take over brownfields that were never properly 
remediated).  Thus, I suggest that the decision to place the NITC in Delray reinforces existing 
political, economic, and environmental inequalities. 
Delray 
Delray, like many polluted urban communities (aka “sacrifice zones”), contains 
crumbling infrastructure, deteriorating housing, chronic unemployment, high poverty, and few 
public services.  The residents of Delray live in dangerously close proximity to a number of 
industrial and heavy transportation facilities, exposing them to what has been described as a 
“toxic soup” of chemicals and toxins.
Typically, when Americans imagine communities that are located near rich natural 
resources but do not profit from their extraction, they consider towns in Africa, Asia, and South 
America where residents live near precious stones like diamonds or emeralds, deposits of 
uranium or petroleum, or near forests.  Yet, despite (or perhaps because of) living at the 
confluence of the Detroit and Rouge Rivers on a stretch of fresh water that connects them to the 
largest body of fresh water in the world (the great lakes), the residents of Delray are part of a 
similar economic system.  They have seen the fresh water and the border effectively profit 
outsiders—starting with French traders to the present steel mills and port—with little profit being
reinvested locally.  Furthermore, over time, fewer and fewer residents have worked in the local 
industries, thereby limiting the benefits that they receive in exchange for hosting facilities that 
use their air, land, and water.
The land where Delray sits today was originally home to Native American tribes who 
were drawn by the fresh water and fish. In 1701, it was colonized by the French, who took 
advantage of the Rivers to trade fur and other goods.  In the 1800s, as a port on the Great Lakes, 
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Delray and the rest of Detroit became increasingly important for shipping raw materials from 
forests, mines, and farms.  In the 1840s, Fort Wayne was built as a defensive reaction to 
threatening armaments by the Canadians across the Detroit River.  
In 1905, while it was a thriving village, Delray was annexed by Detroit.  During this time,
the landscape of Delray began to transition from fertile farmland to filled-in marshes that 
attracted many industries. In addition to shipping, Delray began to prosper from hosting 
industries which were situated along the riverfront (Galster, 2012, p. 48).  
Over time, more and more factories were built along with homes for laborers. The 1920 / 
1921 Detroit City Directory observed: 
A peculiar situation has developed in Detroit… with regard to the location of industries. 
There are no well-defined factory districts, such as are found in most cities. Instead the 
plants are to be found in every section. (As cited in Galster, 2012, p. 49).
In Delray, the most imposing factory was the Solvay Process Company, which produced 
chemicals.  In 1900, Solvay employed 1,000 workers, many who walked to work from the 
neighborhood.  The company invested in the area by providing public lights, paved streets, trash 
pick-up, a water pumping station, sewers, and a horse-drawn fire truck manned by Solvay 
workers.  It established the Solvay Hospital to look after the injuries and illnesses of employees 
without charging a fee.  The Solvay Lodge provided living quarters for foremen.  Workers could 
buy company-subsidized lunches and had access to athletic and recreational facilities (Abonyi, 
Horvath-Monrreal, & Southeast Michigan Regional Ethnic Heritage Studies Center, 1975; Klug, 
1999).  While conducting fieldwork, every so often I heard long-term residents of Delray 
describe Solvay as “a company that did right” by the neighborhood.  Despite the foul smells and 
pollution that came from the company, it employed residents and invested in necessary public 
services.
In the 1920s, Delray was known in the region for its Hungarian population.  It boasted the
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largest population of Hungarians outside of Budapest and was called “Little Hungary” 
(Gershenhorn, 2012).  In addition to its factories, it was known for its thriving business district 
that included lively beer gardens with “gypsy music” and dancing (Nagy, 2011).  During World 
War I, as Detroit industries turned to the south to recruit Blacks to work in their foundries, the 
demographics of Delray began to change. 
While the population of Detroit peaked twenty years later, in the 1950s, the population of
Delray reached its peak in the 1930s at about 24,000 people.  Since the 1930s, however, the 
population has steadily declined.  
At first, the change reflected shifting demographic patterns that were taking place 
throughout Detroit—particularly due to “white flight” (Sugrue, 2005).  Following World War II, 
Blacks, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and southern Whites, attracted by jobs and inexpensive 
housing, began to move to Southwest Detroit in large numbers.  As the Black population grew, it
became concentrated in northeastern part of the neighborhood where the NITC is proposed to 
land today.
As Black residents, Latinos, and southern Whites began to move into Delray, existing 
residents who could afford to leave began to do so and were facilitated by the automobile and 
attractiveness of the suburbs.  Many relocated to the Detroit working-class suburbs of 
Melvindale and Allen Park, and some continued to work in the Delray factories.  During World 
War II, some of the Delray factories temporarily shifted their focus from building cars and car 
parts to providing parts that were needed for the war effort.  Following the war, industries began 
to downsize and / or shift to more mechanized processes in which they required less hired labor 
(Farley, Danziger, & Holzer, 2000). With fewer opportunities for employment, more residents 
left the neighborhood. 
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In 1955, the City of Detroit Master Plan designated Delray as an industrial area despite 
the fact that more than 20,000 residents still lived there.  This decision created a tension between 
the City and residents that has never been resolved.  While the City planned to depopulate 
Delray, its residents worked to protect their investments, schools, faith institutions, and 
businesses. They opposed the City plan and organized to build their community, doing their best 
to maintain and preserve housing, schools, community centers, and faith institutions.  
Despite local resistance and community building, the balance between industry and 
residences shifted in favor of industry.  For example, private and public utilities—including two 
coal-fired power plants—began to fill the vacancies in Delray’s industrial and residential 
patchwork (Larsen et al., 2014).  Residents who did not want to live with the contamination and 
could afford to move out continued to do so.  People seeking affordable housing continued to 
move in.  Residents report that as early as the 1940s, city services in the neighborhood began to 
decline as well.
The 1960 census counted a population of only 13,581 residents in Delray.  In 1964, 
Interstate 75 was constructed and it now boxes in Delray on its the northern border (with the 
Detroit River to the south and the Rouge River to the west).  Although the interstate did not 
result in the widespread demolition of buildings in Delray, it diverted people away from the 
neighborhood business district.  Likewise, Jefferson Avenue, a main thoroughfare in Detroit, was
closed along the Eastern border of Delray.  While touring the neighborhood with a long-time 
resident, I was told that the closure of Jefferson was “the final nail in the coffin” for the 
neighborhood (Williams, 2011).  The neighborhood was entirely boxed in and isolated from the 
rest of the city.  There was no reason for people to drive through it on their way home from work
to pick up something from the small businesses.  Delray, as a neighborhood, was having its limbs
cut off by city planners—once again, without resolving what to do with the residents living in, 
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and even moving to, the area. Over time, as residents became more and more isolated, Delray—
like the residents of most sacrifice zones—became increasingly hidden from view.
By the 1970s, Delray’s population fell to fewer than 10,000 people.  By then, the Detroit 
Water Board expansion practically wiped out its Polish community because of expansion of the 
region’s wastewater treatment plant. When I was touring the neighborhood with the residents 
described above, I asked if residents protested its construction.  She told me that they did not.  
The water board took the land, just a few parcels at a time.  She likened it to a frog in slowly 
boiling water. Thus, a large sub-section of the neighborhood was ultimately taken through 
eminent domain while remaining residents continued to live with the stench of hosting a 
wastewater plant. 
The new industry was not the only reason for Delray’s decline.  The city also began to 
reduce public spending in the area.  Following the 1967 Detroit uprising, $7.75 million allocated 
to relocate Delray residents was redirected toward redevelopment projects in other areas of 
Detroit (Darden, Hill, & Thomas, 1987). The city began to close schools and neighborhood 
centers as well.
By this time, the City of Detroit was also losing manufacturing jobs and residents, and 
the city began to develop a 375-acre parcel in Delray, even though it had obtained no 
commitment from any large industry to use the site. One reason was that the automakers were 
growing out of their small factories, preferring single-story factories that required a lot of land.  
To accommodate them, Detroit’s 1979 Economic Development Plan announced that one of its 
industrial development strategies was to prepare a large industrial site for a single large industry. 
Ultimately, this plan was abandoned for a different site—Poletown—and Delray’s Fisher Body 
Plant, which employed many residents in the community, was closed while its manufacturing 
was transferred to the Poletown plant (Darden et al., 1987).
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A 1975 report evaluating Delray states:
Most of the housing left in Delray was built in the late 1800’s or early 1900’s and is 
showing the ravages of time, pollution and neglect.  Businesses along Jefferson Avenue 
have suffered and the boarded up, burned out, and abandoned buildings on ‘main street’ 
are evidence of the lack of business on one hand, and on the other, the failure of the City 
of Detroit to enforce laws regarding abandonment and absentee landlords. (Abonyi et al., 
1975) 
However, the report ends on an optimistic note because of the emergence of a new civic 
organization and strategy:
Mutual Aide – New Delray, Inc. was formed in March, 1975 as a result of a “Delray 
Revitalization Task Force” meeting called by Council President Carl Levin at the request 
of several Delray organizations, primarily Holy Cross Church, the Hungarian Social and 
Athletic Club, Delray Improvement Association, and Delray United Action Council.  The
purpose of this new non-profit organization was to revitalize, renovate and rebuild 
Delray.  As this guide is printed, changes are being made with the help and cooperation 
of local industry.  Buildings on Jefferson are being cleaned, painted and decorated with 
Hungarian designs suggested by a master plan developed by Alexander Pollock of the 
Community Development Commission, City of Detroit.  The residents of Delray are out 
to prove that heavy industry and families can co-exist in a mutually beneficial 
atmosphere. (Abonyi et al., 1975) – emphasis added
Thus, in some cases, the relationship between citizens and industry was continuing to evolve as 
organizations began to tap into industries to invest in the community.
However, during this time period, there were also instances of resistance to the 
construction of new LULUs.  In 1969, residents organized a NIMBY campaign and effectively 
blocked the construction of a new incinerator that was proposed to be built at the old Solvay 
Process Company site. According to one observer, “This fight brought together the residents of 
Delray closer than they had been, especially in a racially tumultuous environment” 
(Gershenhorn, 2012). 
Today, Delray is one of the most poor, most vacant, most divested, and most polluted 
neighborhoods within Detroit—and certainly within Michigan.  Despite periodic wins, by 2000, 
just 4,000 people lived in Delray, 40 percent of whom were in poverty (Larsen, 2009). Among 
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Detroit communities, Delray is somewhat exceptional because of its racial and ethnic diversity.  
Data from the 2000 Census indicate that Delray’s ethnic composition is White (32.4%) Black 
(32.3%), and Latino (Mexican and Puerto Rican) (30.2%).  
Detroit River International Crossing Study Demographics  
Delray Neighborhood  (Census Tracts 5235, 5236 and 5237) 
Race Total Percent 
White alone 1,351 32.4% 
Black or African American alone 1,347 32.3% 
American Indian and Alaska Native alone 17 0.4% 
Asian alone 4 0.1% 
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander alone 0 0.0% 
Some other race alone 52 1.2% 
Two or more races 141 3.4% 
Hispanic or Latino: 1,253 30.2% 
Total Population 4,164 100.0% 
Source: U.S. Census. 
Although Delray is racially and ethnically integrated, residents similarly impoverished.  
According to the 2000 census, slightly more than 40 percent of Delray households live below the
poverty level. The unemployment rate in Delray was about 11 percent, while the comparable 
statistic for the Detroit region was six percent.  According to a 2007 study:
Few or no residents are employed by local businesses, which is a break with the historical
pattern of the neighborhood … In 2000, of 1,168 workers age 16 and older in the three 
census tracks that comprise Delray, zero travelled less than 5 minutes to work, and only 
121 (10.4%) travelled between 5 and 9 minutes (US census 2000). In short, the Delray 
neighborhood and the local economic infrastructure are not highly integrated, as they 
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once were. Rather, that infrastructure is oriented toward the regional and national 
economy. (The University of Michigan Urban and Regional Planning Program, 2007)
Among residents over the age of 25, three percent have a college education.  Nearly 20 
percent report that their highest degree is an 8th grade education; 34 percent completed some high
school but do not have a high school diploma; and 25 percent have a high school diploma or 
have passed a high school equivalency exam. In 2013, the last school in Delray – Southwestern 
High School – was closed, despite local opposition.
The health outcomes in Delray are also poor.  In Southwest Detroit, the asthma rate is 
three times higher than the state average, and its rate of preventable hospitalization among 
children with asthma is the highest in the city (Tanner-White & Lam, 2010; The University of 
Michigan Urban and Regional Planning Program, 2007).  During my fieldwork, I observed 
several adults stating that they did not have asthma until they moved to Delray.  This is due to 
the fact that in addition to being exposed to disproportionately high levels of toxins, many 
residents of sacrifice zones are susceptible to the ill effects of toxic exposure, due to 
compromised immune systems, poor diet, lack of access to medical care, and other problems 
associated with poverty. 
About a quarter of Delray households reported in the 2000 Census that they did not have 
access to an automobile.  There are no grocery stores in Delray, and only neighborhood 
convenience stores, so residents must leave the neighborhood to purchase fresh food. 
Delray is also unique in comparison with other poor, urban areas because of its vacancy.  
A 2009 study found that of the 1,406 properties in Delray, “924 (or 66%) are vacant lots, many 
of which are substandard residential lots. The conditions of the existing properties with structures
are blighted (180), needs assistance (197), and habitable (105)” (Capital Access & Michigan 
State Housing Development Authority, 2009). 
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The litany of community problems experienced by residents could go on.  During 
community meetings, I frequently heard residents complain about people scrapping the empty 
homes in their neighborhood—a phenomenon that some attribute to the multiple places that buy 
scrap within the neighborhood.  In addition to scrappers stealing metals from vacant buildings, I 
began to hear more and more residents express fears about scrappers lighting buildings on fire 
(some potentially occupied) so that they could access the metal more easily.  While going door-
to-door one day, I came across a home in which the residents—probably in their late 20s or early
30s, and White and Latino—were sitting on the front porch.  They told me that their home had 
been broken into the day prior by a scrapper who stole their air conditioner.  They were watching
out for the person doing it.  As I talked to them, a woman jumped up and pointed yelling, “That’s
him! He just ran into the vacant house!”  One of the men ran up the street while the alleged 
scrapper ran out from the back of the house.  The woman yelled instructions to the chasing man 
to catch the scrapper, but he got away.  The woman then complained to me that the police never 
come and that they have to protect their own property.
Likewise, the only remaining neighborhood center in the community, the same one where
I rented my office, became the “poster child” of scrapping in Detroit.  The Detroit Free Press 
featured People’s Community Services and its Executive Director Tom Cervenak in a front page 
article about the devastation caused by scrapping in Detroit.  In the story, Cervenak recounted 
how the center’s fence had been stolen.  The center was afraid of losing its insurance and had 
reached out to local donors to replace the fence.  Soon after, that fence was stolen and scrapped 
too.
The tensions between residents and industry, as well as residents and city planners have 
not dissipated in Delray.  The 2012 city plan—the Detroit Future City framework—emphasized 
that future land use should complement its “exceptional concentration of very heavy industry, 
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and a unique convergence of freight transportation modes. It should also take advantage of the 
Detroit River and the availability of sound industrial buildings” (Detroit Works Long Term 
Planning Steering Team, 2012).  Thus, the plan calls for more industry, but does not include 
plans to relocate residents—a policy that I have heard many residents refer to as “benign 
neglect” or “demolition by abandonment.”  Many of the remaining residents therefore feel 
trapped in the community, surrounded by industry, unable to sell their homes, while losing city 
services.
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Figure 3 – Industrialization in Delray. Heavy industry is located in close proximity with 
residences in Delray. This photo depicts an operating steel mill just blocks from occupied homes.
(Source: Amy Krings)
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Figure 4 – Reduced and Neglected City Services.  Delray suffers from public and private 
divestment. I took this photo on August 3rd, 2011 while Scott Brines and I toured the 
neighborhood documenting the conditions. In this image, a vat from the region's wastewater 
treatment plant is allowing raw sewage to overflow into the street. (Source: Amy Krings)
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Figure 5. Community Investment.  Despite the growth of industry and corresponding 
divestment, some Delray residents continue to invest in their homes, and more Latino families 
and moving to the area in search of affordable housing. (Source: Amy Krings)
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Figure 6. Community Resistance.  Some residents resist the industrial encroachment, even in 
small ways.
The sign reads:
Attention
sewer plant traffic
this is not the plant driveway
it is a residential street! If you
have no business keep off it
city vehicles included
you are lazy or inconsiderate if you do
you choose what you are
(Source: Amy Krings)
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The New International Trade Crossing (NITC) 
Part two of this chapter shifts the focus of the story from Delray to the proposal that has 
the most potential to change land use in the neighborhood: The NITC.  Before I explain some of 
the factors that led a bi-national team to identify Delray as the host community of the new 
bridge, I need to provide a brief overview of the actors involved in pushing for, and opposing, 
the international crossing.
First, it helps to understand that there is already a border crossing near Delray, located 
two miles up river in Southwest Detroit.  The Ambassador Bridge spans the Detroit River.  It 
was built in 1929, prior to the construction of the interstate system.  Its leg on the Canadian side 
lands in Windsor, in a residential and commercial area.  Therefore, trucks that get off of the 
bridge in Windsor must travel along a city road with many traffic lights before they are able to 
get back onto the interstate system.
The Ambassador Bridge is notable for many reasons.  First, one quarter of trade between 
the United States and Canada crosses it every day, making it the busiest border crossing in North 
America.  This also makes the Ambassador Bridge one of the busiest border crossings in the 
world, as the United States and Canada are the largest trade partners in the world (URS & 
Canada-U.S.-Ontario-Michigan Border Transportation Partnership, 2004).  Thus, multinational 
corporations—who seek the most efficient routes possible to ship their goods—favor an 
additional border crossing.  
Second, the bridge is privately owned.  This means that the largest trade crossing in the 
United States is owned and operated by the Detroit International Bridge Company (DIBC), 
which is owned by a billionaire family whose patriarch is Manuel “Matty” Moroun. In 2004, 
Forbes Magazine estimated that they gross an estimated $60 million per year in toll revenue 
(Fitch & Muller, 2004; Guyette, 2010).  In addition, the family “owns seven trucking companies 
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that use the bridge; a logistics firm; several customs brokerages; and a monopoly on duty-free 
retail, including a gasoline station at the Detroit end of the bridge and a currency-exchange 
service” (Fitch & Muller, 2004).  As part of a trucking empire, it is estimated that the family’s 
total revenue exceeds $1 billion per year (Fitch & Muller, 2004).  The Moroun family and the 
DIBC want to protect their investment from competition. Thus, they vehemently oppose the 
construction of a new border crossing in the region.  Unless, that is, they own the new one too.
For decades, questions about the construction of a new crossing were sidelined or 
postponed, in part because of the Moroun family’s political connections.  However, the political 
landscape began to change in 1994 after the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
was signed.  Following NAFTA, shipping of goods between the U.S. and Canada grew at an 
exponential rate and, over time, the need for a new crossing could not be ignored. The coalition 
that supports the new crossing estimated that $43.8 billion in trade moves through the Detroit-
Windsor corridor annually, and more than "450 major Michigan businesses" count on “the free 
flow of trade with Canada to keep their businesses competitive" (Guyette, 2010). Advocates for 
the new crossing stated that the Ambassador Bridge, which at that time would have been almost 
70 years old, simply did not have the capacity to host the growing truck traffic and, further, it 
was inefficient to have trucks sit in local traffic.  Furthermore, advocates argue that such a huge 
volume of U.S.-Canadian commerce should not be entrusted to such an aging piece of 
infrastructure.  In sum, a new crossing was supported because it would increase efficiency and 
predictability for corporations shipping their goods in light of increasing volumes of trade.  
The push for a new crossing became even stronger following September 11th, 2001.  That 
day, the borders were shut down for hours.  During my fieldwork, residents and elected officials 
recalled how trucks were backed up for miles and miles that day.  Asthma hospitalizations spiked
around that time in Southwest Detroit because of additional diesel emissions released from idling
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trucks.  Additionally, national security officials became involved in the bridge debate, arguing 
that having separate bridges makes it less likely that either would be targeted; taking out just one 
would not shut down international traffic.
Finally, organized labor—particularly the steelworkers’ and carpenters’ unions—
supported the construction of a new border crossing.  Michigan was hit especially hard following
the 2008 recession with few infrastructure projects in the state.  Organized labor supported the 
estimated 10,000 construction jobs that would be required to build the new bridge.  
In sum, a powerful growth coalition emerged to support the construction of a new 
crossing.  Curt Guyette, a reporter at the Detroit Metro Times who followed the NITC 
controversy for years, summarized this coalition best by describing a pro-bridge press conference
in 2010: 
There were Democrats and Republicans. There were a number of trade unionists as well 
as business interests ranging from the local Chamber of Commerce to Ford Motor Co. 
There was the African-American mayor of Detroit and white political power brokers 
from the other side of the Eight Mile divide. There were Canadians and Americans. All 
standing shoulder to shoulder as they joined in unison to praise the proposed bridge they 
said needs to be built between the Motor City and Windsor.
The current governor, Democrat Jennifer Granholm, and a few conservative members of 
the Legislature were there. Jim Doer, the Canadian Ambassador to the United States, was
there as part as a far-ranging coalition that also includes the Michigan Association of 
Counties, the Canadian Auto Workers and the Ohio Senate. It was indeed, as one 
business publication covering the event reported, an "all-star lineup." (Guyette, 2010)
The coalition was not only impressive because of its breadth.  The new crossing was a deeply 
desired infrastructure project, particularly by the Canadian federal government. Canadian 
authorities have called the proposed bridge their country’s most important infrastructure project, 
and they have offered to pay for Michigan’s share of the construction of the new bridge—up to 
$550 million dollars (Gallagher, 2014).  Likewise, Michigan Governor Rick Snyder endorsed the
crossing.  In a 2012 op-ed Governor Snyder wrote:
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Detroit is the busiest commercial border crossing in North America with 8,000 trucks 
crossing the Ambassador Bridge into Canada each day, and all of that trade supports 
257,000 jobs across Michigan. But unless we act now, those jobs could be in jeopardy 
because of our total dependence on the 83-year old Ambassador Bridge as the primary 
point of entry into our neighbor to the north. (Snyder, 2012)
Thus, a coalition that included the Canadian federal government, the Michigan Governor, and 
multinational companies came together to support the new crossing.
Although this coalition likely sounds unstoppable, as previously stated, the new bridge 
had a formidable opponent: Matty Moroun and his Detroit International Bridge Company. As 
Guyette went on to write in the same article on the bridge press conference:
But the fact that they had come together spoke volumes, not just about the importance of 
the issue but also about the power and influence emanating from one octogenarian 
billionaire — Manuel "Matty" Moroun, whose privately controlled Detroit International 
Bridge Company owns the Ambassador Bridge. (Guyette, 2010)
Moroun, who purchased the DIBC in 1979 (Detroit International Bridge Company, 
2011), argued that a new crossing would result in a loss of 70% of his company’s business.  
Thus, the Morouns had a lot to lose and a lot of resources that they were willing to spend on an 
investment that they could not simply relocate.  Plus, they understood that in order for the growth
coalition to secure its new bridge, they would require approvals from the United States, Canada, 
Michigan, and Ontario—some of which would require legislative support while others would 
require technical approvals.  That meant that there were many “veto points” at which the new 
bridge could be voted down or held up in a committee.  So the DIBC did what any company 
would do: it invested in multiple methods (including lawsuits, lobbying, and supporting a 
statewide ballot issue) to prevent, or at least stall, the construction of the new crossing.  As Brian
Masse, a member of the Canadian Parliament from Windsor and a vocal NITC supporter, 
summarized the effort: "When [Matty] wins, and everyone else loses."
Identifying the Host Community
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Despite strong resistance from the Detroit International Bridge Company (DIBC), the 
plan to construct a new crossing moved forward, albeit slowly, over the course of more than a 
decade.  In this final section of this chapter, I will briefly summarize the course of events that led
a bi-national coalition to determine that a new crossing was not only needed, but that the best 
place for it to land would be Delray.  
In the year 2000, the U.S. Federal Highway Administration, Transport Canada, The 
Ontario Ministry of Transportation, and the Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT) 
established the Border Transportation Partnership to “improve the movement of people and 
goods, while addressing civil and national defense and homeland security needs, across the 
United States and Canadian border within the region of Southeast Michigan and Southwest 
Ontario” (Michigan Department of Transportation, 2008). The Border Partnership began by 
conducting a Planning / Need and Feasibility Study to assess the state of border infrastructure 
between the two nations.
In January 2004, the Partnership released its Planning / Need and Feasibility Report, 
identifying “a long-term strategy to meet the needs of the transportation network serving the 
border between Southeastern Michigan and Southwestern Ontario” (URS & Canada-U.S.-
Ontario-Michigan Border Transportation Partnership, 2004).  It determined that additional 
infrastructure was needed, particularly in the region near Detroit, Michigan and Windsor, 
Ontario.  After this, a new study was initiated to assess locations for a new crossing.  This study, 
called the “Detroit River International Crossing,” evaluated eight locations, and it evaluated the 
possibility of “doing nothing.”  During this period, public feedback was collected pertaining to 
all eight sites and environmental studies about the potential impact of the crossing were 
conducted on both sides of the border.  
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In March 2005, the Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT) convened its first 
series of meetings of the Detroit River International Crossing Local Advisory Council to “review
the Bi-national Partnership’s work” and to “provide thoughts” on the location of bridge 
crossings, plazas, and connections to I-75 (Michigan Department of Transportation, 2005).  
These meetings were held in Wyandotte, a comparably affluent and predominately white suburb 
south of Detroit, as well as in Delray.  In interviews with residents and non-profit leaders who 
attended these meetings, I was told that Delray residents “knew” at that time, that, if it was built, 
the bridge was going to land in Delray and not Wyandotte.  In fact, in 2003, when I did my 
Social Work internship in Southwest Detroit, I remember community leaders predicting that it 
would land in Delray even before the that study assessed the need for a bridge was concluded.  
Meanwhile, residents of Wyandotte were extremely organized in a NIMBY campaign to prevent 
the construction in their city.  During some public meetings, Wyandotte residents testified that it 
would be best to put the bridge in Delray since it was already a devastated area.  After residents 
submitted a petition with more than 30,000 signatures against the NITC, the Michigan Governor 
at the time, Jennifer Granholm, stated that the downriver site was an “impractical” option 
(Lefebvre, 2006).
Likewise, residents on the Canadian side of the River organized their own NIMBY 
campaign.  One potential site would have required the railroad tunnel to be converted into a 
truckway that would run under the river, into downtown Windsor, and past the affluent southern 
part of the city.  Residents and elected leaders organized, arguing that the required six lanes 
would create too much havoc in downtown Windsor (Lefebvre, 2006).  One participant 
described how the NIMBY group had “signs all over the city, could produce 1,000 letters in a 
weekend, and they picketed too” (Arditti, 2012).  Ultimately, the plan for an underground truck 
47
highway was abandoned.  Thus, political inequality contributed to the decision to put the NITC 
in Delray.
That left two potential sites in Delray, plus three in Windsor.  Two of the three remaining
Windsor sites were near its downtown and the third Windsor location was a comparatively rural 
area outside of Windsor called Brighton Beach.  One reason that the group evaluating the bridge 
offered to explain why Delray was a potential site was that it represented the most affordable 
option. Delray sits at the most narrow part of the Detroit River which would reduce the size of 
the bridge required.  Also, because property values are so low there, land acquisition costs would
be much lower. In this way, economic inequality contributed to the decision to place the bridge 
in Delray.
As the two Delray sites were evaluated, some residents turned on each other with 
residents of both sites preferring to keep the bridge out of their part of the neighborhood.  At that 
time, one of the proposed locations was in the southwestern part of the neighborhood, an area 
that contained less industry, fewer brownfields, higher residential density, and a higher 
proportion of white residents than the central or eastern parts.  The other proposed site was 
located in the northeastern part of the neighborhood, which contained a higher proportion of 
black residents, as well as several brownfield sites in which factories left without properly 
remediating the land. 
Some of the residents and stakeholders from the western side of the neighborhood, 
including leaders of a historically Hungarian Catholic Church, argued that if the new bridge 
landed in the central part of the community, then it could help to clean up some of the 
contamination. While racially neutral in its selection, the process did not acknowledge the legacy
of placing LULUs in neighborhoods of color.  When we continue to place LULUs in 
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neighborhoods where LULUs already exist, there is likely to be the unintended impact of 
reproducing environmental racism.  
Finally, in December 2005, the Bi-national Study Team announced what residents had 
seen coming for years.  The central part of Delray was identified as an “Area of Continued 
Analysis.” This meant that it was the preferred location to host the crossing, but additional 
studies would be required. MDOT issued a report stating: 
It is recognized, given the nature and extent of land uses and development along the 
Detroit River, it will not be possible to avoid impacts on local communities. The goal of 
the Partnership is to avoid, minimize, or mitigate impacts to the greatest practical extent. 
(Michigan Department of Transportation, 2008)
In the next two years, 2006 and 2007, more public meetings were hosted by MDOT in 
Delray with the Local Advisory Council.  Meetings took place in the City’s Recreation Center or
Southwestern High School (both of which are now closed), where community members could 
“discuss the preliminary results of the analyses of potential impacts that a new bridge, plaza 
(where tolls are collected) and interchange may have” (Michigan Department of Transportation, 
2008). In addition, in 2007, three workshops were held so that residential property owners could 
meet with MDOT’s real estate representatives to discuss the relocation process.  
In the spring of 2008, the Bi-national Study officially announced that the northeastern 
section of Delray was the preferred location to host the NITC.  The technical studies were 
completed, and now legislation would be needed to move the bridge project forward.  One of the 
studies—the Federal Environmental Impact Statement--acknowledged that the NITC would 
contribute to environmental injustice in Delray because of the poverty and racial distribution of 
the host community and corresponding environmental impacts.  
At that time, in 2008, the Southwest Detroit Community Benefits Coalition (CBC) was 
officially born. In the following chapter, I will explain more about how the community weighed 
its options concerning resisting the new crossing.
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Figure 7. The Emergence of the Southwest Detroit Community Benefits Coalition.  During
an October 23rd, 2011 march sponsored by the Southwest Detroit Community Benefits Coalition,
a boy carries a sign that reads “Build a bridge to a healthy community”. (Source: Amy Krings)
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CHAPTER III
From NIMBY to Negotiation:  Deciding to Pursue a Community Benefits Agreement
In 2011, a community-based organization representing the low-income, highly 
industrialized Southwest Detroit neighborhood of Delray organized its members to testify before 
the Michigan State Senate Economic Development Committee about the anticipated 
environmental, economic, and health impacts associated with hosting a new international bridge 
and border.  If built, the controversial new bridge would connect interstates in Detroit with those 
in Windsor, Canada, streamlining international trade, and landing on the U.S. side in Delray.  
The proposed site involved the bridge landing on the U.S. side in the Detroit neighborhood of 
Delray.
One at a time, residents, faith and social service leaders, and business owners from within
what was called the “take area” spoke about their fears associated with being displaced or living 
near a border crossing during the hearing.  Homeowners argued that the bridge plan was already 
devaluing their property – a claim that they substantiated by rhetorically asking who would want 
to purchase a home with the noise, smell, and traffic of an estimated ten thousand trucks per day.
Faith leaders spoke about the high rates of cancer, asthma, and other respiratory illnesses within 
the neighborhood - problems sure to be augmented by the steady stream of diesel emissions.  
Social service providers explained their difficulties with securing donations because the future of
the neighborhood was so uncertain. During his testimony, Scott Brines, the President of the 
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Delray community organization, summarized: “These are the tolls that, if the new crossing is 
constructed in Delray, we will pay on behalf of the State of Michigan.”
Following the Delray testimony, several Committee and audience members expressed confusion 
about the Delray group’s collective decision to endorse the new crossing, on the condition that it 
include a community benefits agreement (CBA).  This decision raises the question: Why, given 
their litany of concerns, were they not organizing to oppose the construction of the crossing in 
their neighborhood?  After all, the Delray stakeholders could have allied with the owners of the 
Ambassador Bridge – who were well-resourced, highly motivated, and willing to exercise all 
tactics at their disposal to prevent this competitive crossing, including allying with the Delray 
stakeholders. As I sat in the chambers of the State Capitol taking field notes, I heard an observer 
behind me whisper: “They are selling the health of their children.”
A Methodological Note
To understand why the Southwest Detroit Community Development Coalition (CBC) 
was formed, and why it campaigned to conditionally endorse the NITC rather than opposing it, 
an examination of the area’s local history, political economy, and collective memory provides 
explanatory power.  This helps to explain the seemingly paradoxical decision whereby a 
community coalition that sought to improve the neighborhood viewed the endorsement of a 
project that would lead to worse air quality and displace residents as its best option.
Prior to explaining the factors that motivated the Delray stakeholders, I want to 
emphasize that any decision can be motivated by many factors and not everyone within a 
coalition has to agree on a policy for the same reasons (George & Bennett, 2005). During the 
course of the bi-national studies (2000 – 2008) and then the CBA campaign (2008 – 2015), the 
factors that motivated stakeholders ebbed and flowed.  Furthermore, this is not a quantitative 
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study in which I can “measure” these motivations and assess gradations and the levels of 
influence of each one, or how they ebbed and flowed over time.  Instead, my work identified  
motivational factors—some of which only became apparent through fieldwork.
Finally, it is important to remember that there were divisions in how people thought 
about the project and its impacts. The most apparent differences were among residents—who 
would be relocated and who would be left behind—as well as between residents and nonprofit 
leaders.  Finally, when I conducted my interviews, it was common for individuals—especially 
residents—to have mixed feelings about the NITC.  In the course of a single conversation, 
respondents could talk about how much they love Delray and therefore wish the NITC would go 
away so that people could live in peace, and then later talk about the importance of securing a 
CBA.  Thus, it is important to remember that there is not “one” Delray interest within this case.  
To think so would not only be inaccurate, but would run the risk of “essentializing” the Delray 
community (Young, 1990) into one unanimous like-minded group.
Campaign Selection: Why a CBA and not a NIMBY?
From the time the NITC was announced, it was understood that it would result in many 
hardships for people living and working in Delray.  Families would have to move out of their 
homes, and some important cultural centers (among them the Saint Paul African Methodist 
Episcopal Church and First Latino Baptist Church) would be closed.  Further, the people who did
not live in the “take area” would be subjected to high levels of noise, traffic, and air pollution 
and their neighborhood would become even more isolated.  Perhaps the greatest concern of all 
was that many residents did not trust the federal, state, or city governments to protect them from 
the impacts of the project. 
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I will argue in this chapter that although Delray stakeholders understood these risks, there
were four dominant reasons that Delray stakeholders conditionally endorsed the NITC, despite 
the possibility of allying with the Detroit International Bridge Company (DIBC) in a NIMBY-
style campaign.
First, the Delray stakeholders saw an unmatched hope that the state would invest in their 
neighborhood as part of the new bridge.  The Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT) 
commissioned and presented plans that included strategies for new housing, new business, and 
even tourist attractions, which were shared with the community. Residents hoped that their 
community would experience an increase in public services and other amenities that they could 
not expect otherwise. 
Second, similarly, as time passed and Delray residents became more skeptical of state 
investment, they remained confident that alternative investment was not planned for their 
neighborhood.  The neighborhood began its decline in the 1930s due to a combination of 
growing industry, declining public services, and residential flight.  Many of the remaining 
residents became economically trapped in the neighborhood because their homes were worth so 
little as housing values declined.  The new bridge represented an opportunity for residents from 
the “take area” to sell their homes and for those left behind to potentially benefit from new 
public and private investment that could accompany the new crossing.  
Third, the Delray stakeholders were heavily influenced by the extent to which they 
considered the two opposing sides of the bridge debate to be trustworthy and accessible.  I found 
that the Delray stakeholders did not trust the private owners of the Ambassador Bridge crossing 
and believed that allying with the Moroun family was the equivalent of “selling out.”  Their 
ethical and moral sensibilities would not allow them to partner with the Morouns.  In contrast, 
the Michigan Department of Transportation was meeting regularly with residents and partnering 
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with them to “vision” what resources might accompany the new bridge, including promises of 
new housing. Anti-Moroun sentiment, combined with the potential for new public investment 
from the state, pushed the Delray group into the “pro-bridge” coalition, where they remained, 
even though this alliance was tested over time.  Furthermore, many of the nonprofit leaders that 
were part of the Community Benefits Coalition were economically dependent upon members of 
the pro-NITC coalition, which included the state, the auto industry, and other corporate funders.
Fourth, the Delray stakeholders quite simply believed that a bridge was going to be built 
in their neighborhood eventually, no matter what they did.  As early as the year 2000, when the 
bi-national bridge study first began, Delray residents and local non-profit leadership believed 
that a new bridge would be built and that it would likely land in their neighborhood.  When it 
was announced in 2008 that the bi-national group planned to move the project forward and that 
Delray represented the preferred host community, few residents were surprised.  By that time, 
although they knew that Matty Moroun and the Detroit International Bridge Company (DIBC) 
would use every resource at their disposal to prevent the new crossing, residents believed that 
eventually – maybe in 20, 30, or even 40 years — the new bridge would be built.  Thus, 
representatives of nonprofits believed that their best strategy was to get the best deal possible 
through collaboration, rather than trying to block the crossing.  
Given these economic and political constraints, in 2008, Delray non-profit and elected 
leaders began to collectively organize the neighborhood and sympathetic organizations in pursuit
of a CBA. They understood the harm that the neighborhood would incur as a result of hosting the
new border crossing, but these factors combined to effectively “organize out” the potential of a 
NIMBY-style campaign.  Thus, their best choice – while not a good one – was to support the 
construction of a new locally undesirable land use in the hope that its positive impacts would 
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outweigh its negatives, rather than to oppose it and allow the neighborhood to continue to die a 
slow death. 
An Unmatched Hope for Revitalization
When the plan to build the NITC was first announced, many Delray residents felt 
strongly that they did not want to host another LULU.  However, due to the long history of the 
City of Detroit and its planning department allowing for the construction of undesirable facilities 
in their neighborhood, many residents concluded that there was little hope for alternative, healthy
investment—perhaps in the form of new housing or green jobs—in the community.  
Since its forced annexation into Detroit in 1905, the relationship between Delray and the 
City has been tenuous and unstable.  As described in Chapter Two, since 1955, the City of 
Detroit has largely instituted policies and development decisions as if Delray was solely an 
industrial zone, despite thousands of residents still living there.  Examples include the placement 
of Interstate 75 near the neighborhood, as well as the placement and expansion of the region’s 
wastewater treatment plant and the concentration of highly toxic factories there.  
Therefore, while their preferred goal was to redevelop the neighborhood in a way that 
included small businesses, “green” jobs, and new housing, therefore also opposing LULUs like 
the NITC, this “ideal” outcome was viewed as politically and economically impossible.  As a 
result, many residents saw the NITC as a “last chance” for an improved quality of life in the 
neighborhood.  In public meetings, MDOT framed the NITC as a source for community 
development, contributing to this hope.  For example, during an April 2006 NITC Public 
Meeting, one resident asked MDOT officials, “Who would purchase the land for redevelopment 
… whether the bridge is built or not?”  An MDOT representative responded: 
If there were not a new crossing, investments in the area by MDOT would be limited or 
non-existent.  If there were a new crossing, MDOT’s investments would be much more 
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significant.  The latter could include benefits for the community of Delray which will 
host the new crossing system”. (Public Meeting, April 2006)
Residents understood this reality and some began to advocate for the new bridge.  One 
stakeholder said, “I’ve been working for 25 years to better Delray.  It seems to me the DRIC 
[NITC] project is the best opportunity we have to do that” (Public Meeting, March 2006).  
Likewise, a member of the Delray Community Council asserted that, “The MDOT effort looks 
great.  MDOT has been working with the community.  What the City has been doing, thus far, 
has not been working” (Public Meeting, March 2006).  
In part, the trust in MDOT was driven by the degree of access and communication that 
residents had with the planning team.  This was unlike anything they had experienced before 
with the state.  For example, MDOT assigned a community liaison to organize monthly meetings
with residents about the scope of the bridge project and its likely impact on the community.  
Between 2008 and 2010, residents were able to access information in a timely manner and began
to consider the possibility of local investment associated with the bridge in their neighborhood.  
Furthermore, participants influenced the selection of sites where the road network would 
converge and a customs center was to be built (Gobert, 2010).
Michigan Department of Transportation representatives and urban planners asked Delray 
residents to imagine what they would like their community to look like with the new crossing.  
Unofficial, non-legally binding images of new homes and fresh streetscapes were created and put
on display.  One depicted residents walking with dogs along green pathways while children 
played in parks and people on bikes passed by, all with the bridge in the background.  
In 2009, a plan was released to construct new housing in a higher-density part of the 
neighborhood, which would provide subsidized homes for residents who were going to be 
displaced and did not want to leave Delray:  
The Delray Village will emerge as a neighborhood of choice for existing and new 
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residents relocated by the DRIC [NITC] and, as the market emerges, for those that earn a 
range of incomes. It will continue to uphold its values of diversity, commitment to 
community, and inter-generational living. New and rehabilitated homes surrounding Holy
Cross Church will enhance the historic legacy of the Delray Neighborhood and 
Southwest Detroit. Quality green space, mixed-use retail, and traffic and streetscape 
improvements will promote sustainable development and a safe quality of life in Delray. 
Residents will benefit from a safer and sustainable community. (Capital Access & 
Michigan State Housing Development Authority, 2009)
There was also a 2010 plan that the CBC helped to create to address redevelopment in the entire 
neighborhood:
Implementation will transform the physical landscape of Delray into a neighborhood of 
choice for existing and relocated residents and prepare Delray for its economic recovery 
through land assembly that supports sustainable industrial, agricultural and commercial 
land use. (Capital Access, 2010)
The plan concluded decisively: “The plan is set. Now is the time to implement”  
(Capital Access, 2010).
There was talk also about how the state could potentially develop the largely abandoned 
historic Fort Wayne, a city-owned park that had fallen into disrepair.  The Fort is home to 
barracks that were constructed in 1848, where soldiers were stationed in preparation for the 
Vietnam War and where the Tuskegee Airmen National Museum and several Native American 
Burial Grounds are still located.  Residents and planners imagined what Fort Wayne could mean 
to the neighborhood if it was a viable tourist attraction: residents could have access to the Detroit
River, and ice cream shops and other local businesses could even serve the tourists.
The Michigan Department of Transportation-sponsored meetings also considered ways to
mitigate harm associated with the new crossing.  Several ideas were discussed regarding how to 
improve Southwestern Detroit High School, which was closed in 2012.  At the time, however, 
Southwestern was open and sat directly next to the planned customs plaza.  One “benefit” 
discussed was that the NITC developer would install an air conditioning system within the 
school so that diesel emissions would not go into the classrooms on hot days.  As for residents 
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whose homes would be required for the NITC, they would either be given fair compensation to 
move elsewhere, or they could have access to a subsidized new home that would be built in 
another part of the neighborhood. The goal was to retain stable residents while creating new infill
housing that would increase Delray’s density.
As described by Delray residents who participated in the Michigan Department of 
Transportation-sponsored local meetings, this time period was filled with hope and promise 
about what new “benefits” the bridge could bring to Delray.  As Michigan State Senator and 
Chair of the Economic Development Committee Michael Kowall told me: “When MDOT first 
went [to Delray], [residents] thought they hit the lottery.  MDOT promised them golf courses and
swimming pools” (Kowall, 2011).  
Toward the end of my fieldwork, optimism that MDOT would “save” the community 
began to wane.  This was in part because the Bridge Deal was signed and Delray had less 
leverage than before.  Starting in 2011, the governor’s office was held by a Republican, and his 
administration was comparably skeptical of “setting a precedent” by including community 
benefits in a new development. This is one reason coalition members opted to pursue a 
community benefits agreement.  The idea was that a CBA would legally bind the state to ensure 
quality-of-life provisions in exchange for hosting the new crossing.
A Way Out from Industrialism and Divestment 
While hope for new investment in Delray declined during the course of my fieldwork, 
fear that the community was going to fall into greater disrepair without the new crossing grew. In
an interview with a long-time Delray resident, I was told: 
People need to understand that this bridge will happen and if it doesn’t, the City of 
Detroit has no plans to help this area. Delray will become the wasteland of Detroit. This 
bridge is our way to improvement. (Williams, 2011)
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Therefore, even if MDOT did not invest in the community, the NITC represented Delray’s only 
shot at public or private investment.
In 2012, the City of Detroit, under the leadership of its former Mayor Dave Bing, 
introduced a plan to “right-size” the city, meaning that it planned to reduce services in areas like 
Delray low population density while concentrating services in higher density communities.  In 
effect, the plan privileged services in neighborhoods that were comparably affluent and with a 
higher percentage of white residents (Detroit Works Long Term Planning Steering Team, 2012).
While most residents joked that the city had stopped serving them decades ago and 
therefore the plan would have no impact, nonprofit leaders began to note that foundations were 
following the city’s lead, and therefore it was becoming harder and harder to raise funds. The 
leader of the only remaining neighborhood center in the area, Tom Cervenak, argued that impact 
of the plan was to evict residents through attrition, which was cheaper resorting to emminent 
domain.  
The plan—and the further decline in public services that included the closure of 
Southwestern High School—only strengthened the belief that the bridge offered a way out – at 
least to those in the “take area” who were unlikely to be able to sell their homes otherwise.  
Notably, calls to expand the take area, to create a “buffer zone” around the new project and to 
take even more homes, grew louder and louder toward the end of my fieldwork in 2014 and 
2015. 
Coalition Politics 
The fight over the New International Trade Crossing included two sides.  The pro-NITC 
growth coalition included Canada, the Chamber of Commerce, craft unions, and multinational 
corporations.  Opposition to the NITC was led by the owners of the Detroit International Bridge 
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Company (DIBC).  Both sides of the NITC debate were interested in mobilizing and partnering 
with Delray neighborhood stakeholders.  The Community Benefits Coalition opted to 
conditionally endorse the new crossing, thereby placing them tentatively on the “pro-NITC” side.
This decision was driven, in part, by the politics of alliance building. Delray stakeholders were 
motivated to avoid a partnership with the DIBC, and they sought to leverage the benefits of 
allying with the pro-NITC side.  Thus, rather than determining a goal first and then building 
alliances based on that goal, to some extent, preferences about their alliances influenced their 
goal. 
The longstanding antagonism between the DIBC / Moroun family and Southwest Detroit 
residents had a decisive impact upon the formation and goals of the CBC.  Diverse individuals 
and groups in Southwest Detroit portrayed a common narrative of Matty Moroun as a selfish, 
untrustworthy neighbor who profited from their community’s misfortunes and ill health. As 
summarized in an anonymous 2005 comment at one of the bi-national study public hearings:  
“The owners of the current bridge do not care anything about the neighborhood.  My perception 
is that they are trying to destroy it and, in a number of areas, they have been successful in this” 
(written comment, MDOT Public Meeting, 2005).   
Stories abound in the neighborhood depicting Moroun as a slumlord who made money 
off of the community without investing back into it.  During fieldwork, I repeatedly observed 
residents recounting the time the DIBC seized a public street to expand the Ambassador Bridge 
plaza, effectively putting a locally owned bait shop out of business.  On other occasions, they 
told the story of how the DIBC seized a local riverside park to create space to expand the 
crossing.  Stories from Windsor circulated about how the DIBC purchased homes where the 
Ambassador Bridge lands in Canada, only to board up the houses, devaluing neighboring 
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property and creating a ghost town. In a 2011 interview with a local pastor, who asked to remain 
confidential told me: 
The DIBC doesn’t care about anyone in the community [and we know this] because they 
have expressed that attitude throughout the years…  [Their] concern for their neighbors 
and the community in which their bridge is, where they have benefited economically for 
many years, hasn’t been too manifest.  Is that a polite way of saying it?  It’s hard to see 
evidence of that concern.” (Interview, 2011)
Even the Toll Road News, which was often sympathetic to the owners of the Ambassador Bridge,
acknowledged the lack of trust that was placed in the DIBC. 
The Ambassador Bridge Company has incurred huge ill-will on both sides of the border 
through the unattractive personalities of the owners, their breaches of contracts, engaging 
in unpermitted construction, and claims of a perpetual right to a monopoly. The bridge 
would probably have to be sold to less tainted owners for any such compromise to be 
struck. (Samuel, 2010)
In short, the image of Moroun as an exploitative, irresponsible neighbor has been widespread and
deeply felt throughout Southwest Detroit.  
Given this antagonistic relationship, Delray residents were faced with a dilemma in 2008 
after the Environmental Impact Statement prepared for the proposed bridge acknowledged that 
its construction would contribute to environmental injustice in the area. Worse, plans to mitigate 
environmental harm within the region actually suggested that the NITC would improve air 
quality in Southwest Detroit because trucks would be able to pass more quickly through customs 
(idling for a shorter period of time) with two bridges rather than one.  While that argument might
have been true in the area around the Ambassador Bridge, Delray stakeholders scoffed at the 
notion that their air would improve with the arrival of an estimated 10,000 diesel trucks driving 
through their neighborhood each day.  
Dissatisfaction with both the new bridge proposal as well as efforts to reduce its negative 
impacts led the CBC board to consider filing a lawsuit alleging that the Environmental Impact 
Statement did not adequately address environmental injustices.  During CBC deliberations, the 
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DIBC along with some of the Detroit non-profits it supports, filed their own lawsuit under the 
auspices that they were suing to block the NITC in order to prevent environmental injustices in 
Delray.  The lawsuit, of course, amused residents who live in close proximity to the Ambassador 
Bridge and have alleged that environmental injustices have resulted from DIBC practices for 
years.  
As State Representative Rashida Tlaib told me in an interview, the Delray stakeholders 
received legal advice that if they filed their lawsuit, the courts would combine it with the lawsuit 
brought by the DIBC instead of considering their claims separately.  In addition, lawyers for 
MDOT would likely instruct their client not to talk with the CBC, which could harm negotiations
between the two parties.  For these reasons, the CBC Board members decided not to file the 
lawsuit – despite their strong concerns about environmental injustice – because (1) they did not 
trust the DIBC and (2) they believed that they would be in a better bargaining position in the 
long run if they kept the lines of communication with MDOT open (Tlaib, 2011).  Ultimately, 
the DIBC case was rejected but it created the odd dynamic – as described in my fieldnotes of the 
public hearing—in which the legal counsel from the Ambassador Bridge appeared to “defend” 
Delray against this proposed LULU while the residents and non-profits from the community 
appeared to support a project that would bring about pollution and displacement.
Nonetheless, some board members spoke out about how allying with the DIBC would 
compromise their morality—something they were not willing to do. One board member who 
represented an organization in Delray had a clause in his organization’s charter that said it would
not ever accept money from the DIBC.  Another board member’s organization accepted money 
from the DIBC to help build a new health center, and that person resigned from her position. 
Over time, the lack of trust and unwillingness to partner with the DIBC created a challenge for 
the CBC because when its needs were not addressed by the pro-NITC coalition, it did not have a 
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viable “exit option.”  If CBC leaders implied that if their needs were not prioritized by the pro-
NITC coalition they might align with the DIBC, their constituency would “freak out.”  As the 
state representative for Delray, Rashida Tlaib, told me, “We couldn’t exactly just whisper to the 
neighborhood, ‘We’re not serious guys!’ People would have seen us as pawns or sell-outs”. 
Thus, the community’s history and collective memories of distrust of the bridge company 
deterred Delray’s residents from organizing in opposition to the new bridge.  
Leverage and Constraints within the Pro-NITC Growth Regime 
The political factors that led the Coalition to align with the pro-NITC coalition included a
belief that Delray would have some leverage and influence among its allies. State Representative
Rashida Tlaib, and her predecessor Representative Steve Tobocman, were able to convince state 
Democrats to withhold votes for the NITC unless the NITC bill included guaranteed benefits for 
the host community.  This withholding was especially powerful because the Republican-
controlled House and Senate were divided on this issue.  Therefore, Governor Snyder understood
that he could not pass the bill without Democratic support and he would not have that support 
without CBA legislation.  In the next chapter, I will explain more about how this played out, but 
the point is that when members of the CBC were strategizing about how to respond to the NITC, 
they perceived that they had influence legislatively.
In addition to its pursuit of political leverage, the Delray response to the NITC was 
limited because of resource dependency.  The CBC received financial and organizational support
from pro-development nonprofits, including a coalition that was created to advance the shared 
interests of labor and industry, and was particularly interested in supporting CBA campaigns in 
Detroit.  These funders supported the creation of sustainable industry and unionized jobs, and 
they viewed the proposed crossing as an opportunity to test the model of a CBA.  The funders 
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provided fiscal support to the CBC, as well as technical support that included flying out 
representatives of a consulting group based in Los Angeles that had experience with securing 
CBAs in association with their port and airport.  These funders would not have supported the 
Delray stakeholders if they had organized a NIMBY campaign to oppose the NITC.
Another way in which funders constrained the range of political goals and tactics 
available to the Coalition was that they chose the Coalition’s fiduciary to be an organization 
called Southwest Detroit Environmental Vision.  The executive board of Southwest Detroit 
Environmental Vision includes representatives from polluting industries located in the 
community, and the organization was developed to be a liaison between these industries and 
Southwest Detroit residents.  Their tactics primarily included campaigns like increasing 
recycling or organizing tire cleanups, rather than pushing industry to reform its practices or 
lobbying the Environmental Protection Agency to increase regulations.  Southwest Detroit 
Environmental Vision supported the goal of a CBA and encouraged the use of institutional 
tactics to pursue it – including letter writing, public testimony, and relationship building (tactics 
consistent with a CBA) – as opposed to civil disobedience, or NIMBY-oriented tactics that 
threatened to disrupt the NITC planning process.  While I did not see evidence of Southwest 
Detroit Environmental Vision actively preventing the CBC from pursuing a comparably conflict-
oriented strategy, tactics, or messaging – it was also clear it they did not encourage that approach
and would have frustrated these efforts if they came about.  Since Southwest Detroit 
Environmental Vision supervised the CBC’s only paid organizer, some issues were non-starters. 
These benefactor relationships with pro-business, pro-labor organizations help to explain 
both how the Coalition was able to organize and why it decided to conditionally support a new 
bridge.  
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It’s Coming Anyway - Get the Best Deal Possible
Finally, in addition to the political relationships and economic constraints that shaped the 
strategy of the CBC, perhaps the easiest limitation to understand is that some residents and 
leaders simply did not think it could be stopped.  As early as 2006, neighborhood leaders began 
to believe that it was better to negotiate than to be left out of the process.  As community leader 
John Nagy told a reporter in 2006, "We don't want a bridge, but we're going to get a bridge, and I
want to be on the front lines of negotiations. And if MDOT doesn't complete their project, we 
will be stuck with Matty Moroun" (Lefebvre, 2006). Similarly, during a 2011 town hall meeting,
State Representative Rashida Tlaib asserted:
We said ‘No!’ when they tried to build the Steel Mill and it still came.  We said ‘No!’ 
when they tried to build the Waste Water Treatment Plant and it still came.  This time, 
instead of saying ‘No!’ and having the bridge built without reimbursement, we are going 
to negotiate and say, ‘If you are going to build this bridge here, then you are going to 
compensate our people’. (Rashida Tlaib, Town Hall Meeting, April 16, 2011)
So the CBC board members made a strategic calculation: they would support the new bridge, but
only on the condition that its financial backers provided something to Delray in the form of a 
community benefits agreement.
Over time, this line of thinking waxed and waned.  Without question, CBC leaders never 
thought that their poor, politically marginalized neighborhood would be able to stop a bridge 
supported by the mighty NITC coalition.  However, the DIBC used such a wide breadth of 
tactics to prevent or derail its construction—including beginning to build its own second span 
adjacent to its existing one—that the new crossing was not a “sure thing.”  Nonetheless, the CBC
leadership reasoned that it was likely that another bridge would be built and, therefore, the best 
they could do was to work for the best deal possible.   
Many residents agreed with this logic, while the majority likely decided that the best they
could do would be to wait until it was all resolved, believing that their participation would not 
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matter anyway.  Some were willing to attend CBC meetings, mainly as a tool to gain information
on the process, but few were interested in devoting time to organizing.
Discussion
Why would a neighborhood pool its limited resources to support something that other 
communities consider harmful to their residents’ quality of life?  This endorsement does not 
square with urban politics literature either.  A prominent theme in urban political theory is that 
there is an inherent conflict between capital and community when it comes to land use decisions 
(Logan & Molotch, 2007). Capital wants to privatize and commodify land to promote its 
exchange value while community seeks to protect its use value.  These conflicts are intensified 
over mega-projects, a type of locally undesirable land use that passes along negative externalities
(air and noise pollution, for example) to the host community (Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003).
To fully understand why Delray pursued the CBA strategy, I argue that it is necessary to 
consider if and how some political choices are “organized out of politics.”  In this case, while 
residents would have preferred to have private and public investment in their community that 
supports good health and sustainable business, they did not believe that new investment would 
happen.  That belief, combined with an unwillingness to ally with some political actors, as well 
as the notion that they could not prevent the new construction anyway, culminated in the 
decision to endorse the CBA.  In sum, the CBA represents a “second-choice” strategy.
This finding differs from previous CBA studies that take the community goal of “CBA” 
at face value, leading these studies consider an obtained CBA to be a “win.”  Instead, this study 
suggests that while CBAs have the ability to bring investments to marginalized neighborhoods 
faced with undesirable development, it is necessary to use caution when interpreting their use 
because, under some conditions, they represent a moderated goal.  
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This finding may also inform our understanding of how economic inequality and 
environmental inequality are linked at the local level.  By studying “non-decisions” that are 
made when contentious issues are avoided or sidelined rather than subjected to obvious and 
observable challenge (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962), we are able to consider how only some issues –
particularly those that are comparably threatening to powerholders – are suppressed and 
prevented from entering the political process. This is the mobilization of bias – the confining of 
decision-making to safe issues (Schattschneider, 1960).
Ultimately, my findings call into question the nature of choice in the context of extreme 
inequality.  It helps to explain why some host neighborhoods sometimes support seemingly 
unjust policies, blurring “perpetrator” and “community defender” in ways that might seem odd 
on the surface (Pellow, 2004).
 During an interview with CBC President Scott Brines in 2011, I observed, “It almost 
seems as though there’s this trade-off between jobs and health, and that just seems like a terrible 
choice.”  Brines responded:
It’s not much of a choice, is it?  Yeah, so, it’s funny, that’s my biggest
take on all of this.  Why aren’t we just saying ‘No? No, we can’t afford it
right now; we can’t afford the health issues.’ But there’s something inside
of people that makes them say, ‘Gosh, we’ve been fighting this over and
over for years – it never changes.  But maybe this time it will’. (Brines,
2011)
  
The pursuit of a CBA is the CBC’s attempt to reconcile impossible competing demands, to use 
the few resources at its disposal to try to gain the best situation for stakeholders’ families and 
neighbors, to fight pollution and environmental degradation without giving up on the hope for 
future development. 
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CHAPTER IV
Access Denied: Obstacles to Community Benefits Agreements
As explained in chapter 2, Delray was chosen to host the new crossing, in part, because it 
had less political and economic power as compared to the other evaluated host sites.  In chapter 
3, I demonstrated how a legacy of industrialism and divestment, combined with unattractive 
allies and the perception of political powerlessness, influenced the Delray stakeholders’ response
to the new crossing, effectively removing a NIMBY campaign from their range of viable 
strategic responses.  
In this chapter, I utilize a political ethnographic methodology to examine power 
dynamics within the Delray CBA campaign, particularly during the years of 2011 – 2012.  My 
data is complemented by interviews with six of the seven members of the Michigan State Senate 
Economic Development Committee, including its chair, as well as the lead lobbyists for the pro-
NITC Coalition (Tom Shields) and the head of the anti-NITC group, the Michigan Chapter of 
Americans for Prosperity (Scott Hagerstrom).
In 2011 - 2012, the CBC strategy was to organize community members, to build a 
coalition, and to partner with their State Representative to require any new bridge legislation to 
include a provision that the developer would negotiate a CBA with the neighborhood.  In 2010, 
the NITC bill was debated in the State House Transportation Committee and in 2011 it was 
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debated in the State Senate Economic Development Committee.  In both years, the bridge bill 
was not taken up for a floor vote, thus killing the bill.  By tracing the Delray campaign for a 
bridge bill that included local investments, I shed light on the actors who intentionally and 
unintentionally undermined the Delray campaign.  I introduce three categories of actors that, 
while not necessarily opposed to CBA legislation, created obstacles for the Delray group, 
effectively acting as policy-making “gatekeepers.” These categories include: (1) groups that 
unconditionally opposed the proposed development; (2) groups that unconditionally supported 
the proposed development; and (3) groups that viewed the host community as a “competitor” in 
efforts to secure their own concessions.  By manipulating, tokenizing, and minimalizing the host 
community’s concerns about local impacts of the proposed bridge development, these groups 
contributed to legislators’ decisions to block a CBA bill.  
Setting the Agenda
Community benefits agreements emerge from negotiations between a developer and the 
local coalition. However, in many cases, developers have been incentivized to negotiate with 
local groups, in part because the city requires them to do so in order to gain necessary public 
approvals and / or subsidies.  Given that CBAs are negotiated within contextualized 
environments rather than based upon a standardized law, their strength varies.  
In the case of the New International Trade Crossing, legislative approval was needed 
from the elected bodies representing Canada, Ontario, and Michigan.  Approval was not required
from the US federal government, although a host of federal agencies such as the Coast Guard 
had to give their approval.  
In 2011, a bill to approve the construction of the NITC was placed in the Michigan State 
Senate Economic Development Committee.  This committee, composed of seven legislators – 
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two Democrat and five Republican – represented a potential “veto point” within the bridge 
debate.  In other words, even though elected bodies from Canada and Ontario approved the 
bridge deal, if Michigan did not approve it as well, the NITC would not come to pass.  
The task given to the Economic Development Committee was to decide if the NITC bill 
merited a vote on the floor of the entire Senate.  In this way, the committee possessed agenda-
control powers (Cox & McCubbins, 2005), enabling it to block legislation from going up for a 
vote.  For eight months, the merits of the NITC were debated.  As reported in an editorial in the 
Detroit Free Press:  
Ongoing hearings convened by state Sen. Mike Kowall, R-White Lake Township, who 
chairs the Senate Economic Development Committee, seem calculated to perpetuate the 
bridge controversy rather than to dispel it. The hearings have left many with the 
erroneous impression that the accusations Moroun levels in his ubiquitous prime-time TV
spots have yet to be answered definitively; in fact, those distortions have long since been 
refuted. (Editorial, 2011a)
Thus, State Senator Kowall and the Committee were effectively stalling – even potentially 
blocking the NITC.
Within that context, the CBC was working to leverage its limited power and influence.  
At that time, their main message was that they supported the NITC, on the condition that it 
included a legally binding CBA.  Thus, they opposed any bill that would allow for the NITC that 
did not include a clause with explicit community protections.  In the following section, I analyze 
the power dynamics that unfolded within this context, contributing to the Senate Economic 
Development Committee voting against the joint NITC-CBA bill.  I demonstrate how both the 
anti-NITC coalition and the pro-NITC coalition, under some conditions, undermined the Delray 
strategy.  Finally, I argue that competitor groups—who also wanted to control concessions 
associated with the crossing—decreased the host community’s power and influence.
Groups that Unconditionally Oppose the Development
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With any new development, there may be groups that oppose it, such as business owners 
who oppose new competition or public health and environmental activists who oppose negative 
impacts associated with the development.  
In the case of the Community Benefits Coalition and the proposed new bridge crossing, 
without question, Manuel “Matty” Moroun and the Detroit International Bridge Company 
(DIBC) have been the most motivated and forceful opponents of the New International Trade 
Crossing. The Morouns own the Ambassador Bridge, located two miles from the site of the 
proposed new bridge, and their total revenue is estimated to exceed $1 billion per year, including
$60 million per year from tolls and $15 million per year in gas and duty-free sales (Fitch & 
Muller, 2004; Muller, 2012).
The DIBC has a strong economic incentive and the resources necessary to operationalize 
nearly every method of political influence available so as to block the new crossing. For 
example, according to data collected by the Michigan Campaign Finance Network, between the 
years of 2007 – 2011 the Moroun family made nearly $800,000 in political contributions to 
Michigan legislators – both Democrats and Republicans – who would vote on the new crossing 
(Robinson, 2012); $1.5 million to state and congressional candidates in the 2009 – 2010 election 
cycle alone (Christoff & Gray, 2011).  Their biggest donation was given on September 28th, 
2011, the same day that Michigan State Senate Economic Development Committee held a 
hearing at the State Capitol about the local health impacts associated with the NITC.  That day, 
Matthew Moroun, son of Matty, made a $100,000 political contribution to the Michigan State 
Republican Party (Berfield, 2012). In addition to donating to key legislators and political action 
committees, the DIBC has sought to block the NITC by running a series of advertisements 
created to influence public opinion against the new bridge proposal, and they have donated to 
nonprofit organizations that also oppose the NITC.  
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The DIBC has resources available to target many Michigan constituencies with anti-
NITC political frames. One frame that appeared in several advertisements played up animus 
toward Detroit targeting conservative voters.  This frame linked the NITC with the CBA 
proposal, and then characterized the CBA as a form of Detroiters’ greed, corruption, or 
entitlement.  For example, an ally of the Bridge Company, the Michigan Chapter of Americans 
for Prosperity, framed the CBA as “welfare by another name” (Bell & Gallagher, 2011; Sledge, 
2011) sent a mailing to their constituency with an image of dollars swirling into a toilet bowl, 
along with a photo of a street sign for the city limits of Detroit.  Its text characterized CBAs as 
yet another example of hardworking Michiganders wasting their money by bailing out 
irresponsible or corrupt Detroiters. Similarly, the DIBC sent a mailing to Michigan voters with a 
picture of dilapidated homes in Delray with the caption “More of your money for Detroit? Don’t 
let the politicians give away more pork projects and ‘special give aways’ for the new bridge” 
(Egan & Gallagher, 2012). Critics and residents decried this mailing, stating that it stoked “anti-
Detroit sentiment”, and played upon racial and class animosity.  Nonetheless, the damage was 
done.  The CBC did not hold have access to the same resources as the DIBC and thus struggled 
to frame the CBA as an “ethical” policy that would protect the poor, as opposed to an “unethical”
policy that would line the pockets of lazy Detroiters. This frame influenced and gave political 
cover to Republican State Senators who received financial support from the DIBC and voted 
against the NITC.
At the same time that the DIBC and Americans for Prosperity framed the CBA (and thus 
the NITC) as a bad deal for Michigan, the DIBC advanced another frame intended for a different 
constituency group. In this case, advertisements were purchased that featured a Delray resident 
who opposed the NITC because she wanted to protect her community and her home. The 
problem?  No one on the CBC Board, including lifelong residents of Delray, had ever seen or 
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met this woman.  This frame aimed to portray Delray residents as the victims of the NITC, thus 
motivating voters to oppose the NITC due to its abuse of vulnerable citizens. While this frame 
could have helped the CBC, to an extent, members of the CBC Board also thought it 
misrepresented their position and minimized the voices of the people impacted by the NITC.
Later, Americans for Prosperity tried to mobilize Delray voters by going door to door 
suggesting that they were going to have their homes taken without fair compensation. Later still, 
their members posted fake eviction notices on residents’ doors – attempting to demonstrate what 
“could” happen if the bridge landed in Delray (Hagerstrom, 2011). Again, critics and residents 
decried the tactic. In response, the Bridge Company – which acknowledged a relationship with 
Americans for Prosperity – condemned the flyers.  Americans for Prosperity, however, defended 
them saying:  
Obviously some people were quite upset by it. If you read the actual copy, it's fairly non-
controversial in my opinion. We actually quoted directly from the legislation itself .(Sledge, 
2011)
In a way, the flyers served to unintentionally advance the CBA campaign.  After months of the 
CBC of trying to get its message into the media, the controversy about the flyers demonstrated 
that Delray was at risk of being exploited by the DIBC and the pro-NITC coalition (Editorial, 
2011b).  
Americans for Prosperity were unsuccessful in their efforts to mobilize a strong 
community-based NIMBY campaign.  Nonetheless, local NITC opposition was still supported 
by the DIBC, which paid protesters – a practice known as “astroturf” organizing – to show up at 
public hearings about the NITC. In 2010, a group that was lead by Detroit Pastor Horace 
Sheffield spoke out against the NITC. Pastor Sheffield acknowledged that he had taken 
advertising dollars from Moroun to support his radio show, but stated that these donations were 
not the reason he opposed the crossing (Sledge, 2011).  In CBC meetings during interviews, 
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CBC members stated that after the 2010 hearings, members of Sheffield’s group apologized to 
Delray residents, saying that “they didn’t know” what the campaign was about and that they 
were simply told that they could make $40 by showing up.  
In 2011, a new group emerged in opposition to the NITC: The New Black Panther Party. 
Consistently, Minister Shabazz and his members arrived at the State Capitol in Lansing on 
chartered buses with professionally made signs, some of which said, “Save Delray.”  Yet, despite
this signage, the group had a highly contentious relationship with the Delray residents.  On 
several occasions I watched as Delray residents and members of the New Black Panther Party 
got into verbal arguments over who had the “right” to speak for Delray.  Furthermore, the New 
Black Panther Party complicated the CBC campaign by offering Democratic State Senators 
political cover to say that they opposed the NITC because of objections within the host 
community.  
The most problematic fight for the Delray group happened immediately following the 
failed vote in the State Senate Economic Development Committee.  A few members of the New 
Black Panther Party began to taunt Delray’s State Representative Rashida Tlaib as she was 
interviewed by a reporter.  Some of the men from the Delray delegation spoke up to defend her, 
accusing the Minister Shabazz of being paid off by Matty Moroun.  A Pastor from Delray 
stepped up, saying, “I know this man – it’s about money.”  Minister Shabazz replied, “I deserve 
to get paid – what have you done?” calling the Delray Pastor an “Uncle Tom” for supporting the 
“Governor’s Bridge.”  As voices were raised, many television and newspaper cameras pointed in
the direction of the fight.  This scene played on the news and ultimately damaged the Delray 
stakeholders’ ability to position themselves as “respectable” and “trustworthy” in the eyes of 
Lansing politicians. 
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To be clear, it is possible that the Michigan Chapter of Americans for Prosperity and the 
New Black Panther Party truly did oppose the NITC and that the money they received simply 
amplified their voices. For his part, Minister Shabazz acknowledged that he has accepted 
thousands of dollars from the Bridge Company, but said that his organization has used that 
money to do good work in the community and to compensate supporters for their time.  As he 
told a reporter: "You know what these poor Negroes did? They went and they bought 
groceries.... I'm not ashamed of that" (Sledge, 2011).
While none of these acts are illegal, the members of the CBC assert that their voices and
interests – belonging to people who will have to bear the burdens associated with the new
crossing – have been drowned out because the DIBC has been so successful in framing the
debate on the NITC in ways that diluted the CBC’s message and damaged their credibility.  
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Figure 8. Oppose the Bridge. This bus dropped off members of the New Black Panther Party at 
Cobo Hall on the day that Michigan and Canada representatives signed the bridge agreement. 
(Source: Sian Dowis)
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Groups that Unconditionally Supported the New Development
The second category of actors that have complicated efforts to pass CBA legislation 
includes groups that unconditionally supported the NITC.  The groups in this category stood to 
benefit from the jobs and investment associated with the development, and as a result, ignored or
downplayed negative impacts on the host community. Multinational corporations, the Canadian 
federal government, organized labor, and Michigan Governor Rick Snyder were among the 
NITC’s strongest supporters. While not necessarily opposed to guarantees of host community 
protections, if the CBA threatened to stall or block NITC legislation, in some cases, members of 
this group tried to coopt community members, minimize the NITC’s negative impacts, and 
deprioritize the importance of the CBC’s claims.
In 2011, as the seven members of the Michigan State Senate Economic Development 
Committee prepared to vote on the NITC, pro-bridge advocates understood that securing a 
majority of four votes would be difficult due to the DIBC’s heavy lobbying.  Three Republican 
legislators, including the Committee’s chair, were not going to vote for the NITC under any 
circumstances—with or without a CBA.  The two remaining Republican Senators had been 
influenced by the DIBC’s framing of the CBA and were unwilling to vote for the NITC bill if it 
included legally binding community protections.  The two remaining members of the committee 
– both Detroit Democrats – stated that they would not vote for the NITC unless the bill included 
CBA provisions. Thus, the CBA became a wedge issue. Pro-NITC lobbyists knew that they 
could not get the four votes they needed unless they were able to convince the Democrats to vote
for the NITC, without a CBA.  
Under these conditions, the pro-NITC coalition that had until then be relatively 
supportive of the Delray community began to shift its messaging.  Pro-NITC lobbyists did this 
by presenting three arguments. First, they told members of the CBC as well as the Democratic 
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Senators that without the new bridge, Delray would have no hope of revitalizing itself – thus the 
NITC would benefit Delray.  Second, they asked CBC leaders to endorse the bridge bill without 
an accompanying CBA, promising to help secure community benefits later in the political 
process.  And third, they told elected officials that there really was not a great need to pursue a 
CBA because the bridge already contained benefits in the form of federally required mandates.  
As explained by MDOT’s Communications Director Jeff Cranson, "It is expected that the
NITC project, as well as other unique resources and infrastructure in Michigan will catalyze the 
creation of one or more transportation, distribution and logistics hubs that will spur long-term 
economic growth and job creation in economically disadvantaged Detroit" (Sands, 2014). 
Similarly, on the day that the NITC deal was signed, the political director for the Michigan 
Regional Council of Carpenters told me:
The pollution [in Delray] is bad… and this is something I’ve told the citizens of Delray – 
Without a bridge, there will be no benefits. There are federal guidelines with regard to 
community development projects of this size.  I think in order to be able to foster this 
project we’re gonna have to lean on the federal guidelines absent a wholesale community 
benefits agreement”. (McCreary, 2012)
CBC leaders, on the other hand, weren’t buying this logic. They did not believe that the bridge – 
by itself – would improve the neighborhood’s economy, nor did they believe federally mandated 
environmental protections were comprehensive enough to adequately address the unique 
environmental and health impacts that the host community would experience. In addition, they 
were skeptical that pro-NITC business leaders would help them negotiate for benefits after the 
bridge bill had passed. This skepticism was atttributed to years of hosting heavy industry with 
limited local accountability or investment.  Thus, the CBC leadership came to be at odds with 
members of the pro-NITC coalition because they would not endorse the new bridge without the 
inclusion of a CBA, and they asked the same of their Democratic representatives.
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When it came time for the State Senate Economic Committee to vote on the NITC, two 
bills were advanced.  The first vote was for the NITC without a CBA.  The three Republicans 
who opposed the NITC voted against it, as did the two Democrats.  That bill was voted down.  
The second vote was for the NITC with a CBA.  Again, the three Republicans who opposed the 
NITC voted against it, and this time the two other Republicans voted “no” as well.  Thus, the 
Committee utilized its agenda control power to prevent the bill from going to the floor of the 
Senate for a vote – effectively blocking its passage.
Following the failed vote, the “alliance” that had existed between the pro-NITC coalition 
and the CBC shifted.  Some members blamed Delray for blocking the most important 
infrastructure project in North America.  Others were more savvy.  They didn’t blame Delray – 
they saw Delray as a scapegoat.  After all, both Republicans and Democrats took money from the
DIBC.  They argued that Delray and the CBA were simply an excuse used by at least one of the 
Democratic Senators to support the DIBC in a way that would not place them at odds with their 
constituents. It’s impossible to know what the legislators “true” motivation was, but I can say 
that in several interviews with the Democratic Senator in question, I was told, “Just follow the 
money – always follow the money” (Smith, 2011).
 As the CBC began to regroup, it was clearly demoralized.  Some Delray residents who 
wanted to move blamed the CBC for being a pawn of Matty Moroun’s.  Yet the majority – at 
least of those who came to CBC Community Meetings – agreed that the NITC would not be 
beneficial to the neighborhood without a CBA.  They agreed with their state representative, 
Rashida Tlaib, who described the pro-NITC coalition this way:
It’s almost like [the pro-NITC coalition members] want everybody to die off, to just
trickle off, for us to be quiet, to just ‘Shhhh’. ‘This is great for the city, shhhhh.’ ‘This is
great for the state.’ But, what about the people who have to live next to this bridge for
decades, decades to come? What about them? What about the increase in kids that are
going to have asthma? What about the fact that we’re not going to have anybody left in
that area?  And what are you going to have? You’re going to have an infrastructure that
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looks so gorgeous next to decay of human rights, of people just living next to this thing.
It’s just not the right thing. It’s the un-American thing to do. (Graham, 2012)
Figure 9. Support the Bridge. On the day that the NITC bridge deal was signed, representatives
of organized labor were there with “Support the Bridge” signs to support the NITC.
In this photo, CBC board member Tom Cervenak asks the NITC advocate to change his sign to 
read “Support the Bridge – And a CBA”. (Source: Amy Krings)
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Groups Competing to Secure Their Own Unique Benefits
In 2012, Republican Governor Rick Snyder went around the Legislature, signing a deal 
with Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper to build the NITC.  That bill alluded to a need for 
community protections, but did not include any guarantees.  At that time, a third category of 
actors began to become more prominent in challenging the CBA campaign.  Members of this 
third group sought to obtain their own unique benefits associated with the crossing.  When they 
viewed the host community’s demands as being in competition with their own, they were 
incentivized to undermine the Delray campaign and / or to lobby for their demands to be 
prioritized above those of the host community. 
During the course of the Delray campaign, there were instances of neighboring 
community groups, non-profits, and even faith leaders asserting that they – not the host 
community or the CBC – were the most appropriate recipients of benefits associated with the 
bridge development. However, the entity that was most effective in controlling the distribution of
local benefits associated with the NITC was the Detroit Economic Growth Corporation, a quasi-
governmental economic development organization that works closely with the City of Detroit. 
The Detroit Economic Growth Corporation advocated to be the primary representative of any 
money intended for local groups and, in doing so, marginalized the CBC.
There are several factors that shaped the competitive dynamic between the CBC and the 
Detroit Economic Growth Corporation. Fundamentally, they had different visions regarding both
appropriate decision-making authority as well as the ideal nature of investment in Detroit. The 
Community Benefits Coalition advocated for local control and local improvements, reasoning 
that the host community would bear the greatest costs associated with the development and, 
therefore, they deserved targeted investments.  The CBC sought to improve “use values” within 
Delray by promoting sustainable development, such as parks, trees, and affordable housing. 
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In contrast, the mission of the Detroit Economic Growth Corporation is to grow the 
economic base of the city and it thus seeks to transform land into its highest possible “exchange 
value.”  The Detroit Economic Growth Corporation perceived that Delray’s highest and best use 
was as an international trade hub because of its riverfront location, proximity to the interstate 
system, and – soon – international border crossing. The Detroit Economic Growth Corporation 
argued that by repurposing the land and focusing on large-scale transportation and industrial 
investments, the city’s economy would benefit over the long term.  
As the NITC vote was unfolding, the City of Detroit, in collaboration with several 
foundations, was in the midst of creating a development framework for the city (at that time 
called the Detroit Works Project and later called Detroit Future City).  Part of this strategy 
included reducing public services in low-density neighborhoods like Delray while targeting 
investments in higher density neighborhoods.  In 2012, Mayor Dave Bing expressed this logic in 
an interview about plans for low-density neighborhoods:
I don’t have enough money to invest in your neighborhood. I would prefer to refurbish 
homes in the more stable neighborhoods and get you all to move and have a better quality of
life.  You can be safer. You can have the bus service.  You can make sure your trash and 
garbage is going to be picked up like it ought to be. Police, fire, schools, you name it—all of
the things that make up a good community, that’s where I want you to move.  Now, if you 
want to stay where you are, that’s your choice.  But you do need to understand you’re going 
to be at a disadvantage by not coming to the core of the city. (Yeoman, 2012)
Thus, the Detroit Economic Growth Corporation, Mayor Bing, and the Planning Commission 
supported the notion of local investments associated with the NITC, but wanted to control where 
and how the money was spent.  The City made it clear to the Snyder Administration that any 
negotiations concerning a CBA needed to come through its office and, furthermore, a 
representative of the Mayor’s office made it clear that the city would no longer support housing 
in Delray (Henderson, 2012).
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Similarly, in 2014, when the State purchased public land owned by the City in order to 
assemble the customs area, Delray received support from the City Council, but not the Mayor or 
Emergency Manager, in arguing to have some of that money reinvested in the host community.
The CBC felt completely undermined by the City.  Having previously secured a promise 
from the State for new housing in Delray to facilitate resident relocation, the City was now 
stating that it would not support this development.  Thus, the City and Detroit Economic Growth 
Corporation played a gatekeeping role in preventing the CBC from being able to reach a position
in which it could negotiate for a community benefits agreement.
Discussion
The case of the Southwest Detroit Community Benefits Coalition demonstrates how 
actors may intentionally or unintentionally act as “gatekeepers” by complicating efforts to secure
CBA legislation.  Opponents of the development may negatively frame the CBA to block or 
derail the project itself; supporters of the project may seek to placate or manipulate the host 
community so that its efforts to pursue the CBA do not stall the project; and groups that seek 
their own benefits and concessions may compete with the host community to establish 
themselves as the best or most appropriate beneficiary of local control and investments.
This finding matters for a number of reasons.  First, it contributes to literature that 
evaluates CBAs as a policy tool to promote equitable development.  Within the existing 
literature, nearly every study examined the success of CBAs by drawing their sample from 
campaigns that were able to compel the developer to negotiate.  While this sampling procedure 
can identify power dynamics within a truncated sample, communities that do not organize or that
organize but are not able to get to the negotiation table, are under-studied and rendered invisible. 
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 In contrast, because I examined a CBA campaign at a much earlier point, I was able to
identify some of the conditions under which interest groups may intentionally or unintentionally
undermine, tokenize, or manipulate residents of the host community in their efforts to secure
community investments. Furthermore, I demonstrate that in order to obtain a CBA, host
communities must navigate a political landscape that is far more complex than a binary debate
between the developer and host community.  In sum, this finding suggests the need to exercise
caution when evaluating the viability of CBAs as a policy tool to systematically protect the low-
income neighborhoods that are targeted to host development projects. 
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CHAPTER V
The Promise and Limitations of Local Organizing for Equitable Urban Development
After eight years (2000 – 2008) of uncertainty and waiting while Delray was assessed as 
a potential host for the NITC, four years (2008 – 2012) of unsuccessfully campaigning for a 
CBA through the Michigan State Legislature, and three years (2012 – 2015) of waiting for the 
United States and Canadian representatives to complete their federal approvals, the process of 
finally buying land to build what is now called the Gordie Howe International Bridge has slowly 
begun.  After fifteen years of public meetings, testimonies, and promises that the bridge would 
come soon, Delray residents, faith leaders, and business owners have grown used to a feeling of 
uncertainty and skepticism relating to whether and when the NITC will land in their 
neighborhood.
This drawn out process has had many impacts on the Southwest Detroit Community 
Benefits Coalition and its CBA campaign.  First, people are tired of meeting.  This makes it 
incredibly hard for the CBC staff and board members to mobilize residents, to develop leaders, 
and to build a powerful grassroots organization.  Nonetheless, there were opportunities for the 
CBC to take on smaller issues that were comparably winnable (pressing the city to tear down 
abandoned homes and pressing the waste water treatment plant to prevent raw sewage from 
spilling into the street are two that come to mind), perhaps institutionalizing Saul Alinsky’s 
practice principle of starting small, getting a win, and taking on bigger issues over time (Alinsky,
1971; Bobo, Kendall, & Max, 2001).  On the other hand, the idea of mounting additional 
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campaigns – beyond the CBA campaign – may have felt like a drain on limited resources, rather 
than a mechanism to gain power and political efficacy.
Another impact is that as the fifteen years passed, Delray continued to lose public 
services – including the closure of Southwestern High School and Rademacher Community 
Center – and many homes were lost due to scrapping and arson.  The population continued to 
decline, and more people who could afford to leave grew tired of waiting for the NITC and 
moved out.  Frankly, some members even died – a reality in any campaign – although it was hard
not to feel that death and chronic illness among members was not premature, in part due to the 
high rates of contamination.
Among residents and business owners who remain in Delray, many felt trapped.  First, it 
was unclear what the boundaries of the NITC take area would be, so some residents did not 
know if they would be bought out, or if they would have an international border crossing across 
the street when all was said and done.  Likewise, residents were told that they would not be 
compensated through eminent domain if their home was not their principle residence.  So year 
after year, they waited.  Many did not want to continue to invest in their homes, knowing that it 
was unlikely that they would make their investment back. So people like resident Mario 
Hernandez waited to fix their roofs, paint their walls, or even plant flowers in the yard.
Some business owners experienced similar anxiety.  CBC Board Member Julie Ebsch 
attended MDOT meetings, public hearings, and Committee meetings at the State Capitol for 
more than a decade – still unsure if her business was in the take area and, if so, what that would 
mean for her company.  Following a community meeting I spoke with Don Graham, who owns a
funeral home that is located where the interstate will need to be widened.  He told me that the 
delay is similar to “knowing that you have cancer and waiting to die”.
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A CBC Board Member who helped create the organization in 2008 told me that one of 
the most important things that she learned about CBA campaigns – and what she wanted people 
considering pursuing a CBA to know – was that there has got to be a way to negotiate at the 
beginning of the project.  In megaprojects like the NITC, the delays involved take too much of a 
toll on the neighborhood and result in a loss of power and energy over time.
Finally, the process contributed to residents and CBC members becoming more and more
resigned to the notion that their neighborhood would never be a healthy, residential community 
again.  Eventually, somehow and someday, the neighborhood was going to host a large bridge 
project.  There were just too many powerful forces that desired it.  So even if Matty Moroun and 
the Detroit International Bridge Company were able to block bridge legislation, they would only 
stall it – not prevent it.  Thus, as State Representative Rashida Tlaib explained to me, “delay” is 
even worse than having a bridge when it comes to the health of the community.  Over time, it 
caused many residents to lose interest in a CBA, preferring the bi-national authority to “just build
it” so that they could move on with their lives.
The Nature of Power in the Construction of Locally Undesirable Land Uses
Since the late 1980s, there has been a growing recognition of the disproportionate share 
of undesirable development placed in low-income communities of color, and the resulting racial 
and class disparities in environmental contamination exposure and health impacts (Bryant, 1995; 
Bullard, 1993; McGurty, 1997; Mohai & Bryant, 1992).  In response, neighborhood-based 
mobilizations for environmental justice have emerged as an important force in urban politics 
around the world (Auyero & Swistun, 2009; Checker, 2005; Newman, 2011).   Many of these 
localized campaigns fight for procedural and distributive benefits associated with the 
development, ranging from local accountability and decision-making authority to relocation 
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assistance to concentrated investments such as traffic routing, public services, and local hiring 
agreements.  
One policy tool, a community benefits agreement (CBA), aims to mitigate harm 
associated with urban development while sharing the benefits of anticipated positive outcomes 
(Baxamusa, 2008; Gross, 2008; Gross et al., 2002; Janis, 2007; LeRoy, 2009).  As noted in 
earlier chapters, a CBA is a contract negotiated between a developer and a coalition of local 
groups that typically include community-based, labor, and environmental organizations. Rather 
than resulting from environmental rules or regulations, they typically emerge from bilateral 
negotiations between the developer and local CBA coalition.  Thus, for a community to secure a 
CBA, it must have enough power and leverage to successfully compel the developer to negotiate,
to bargain for concessions, and ultimately to ensure that the developer’s promises are kept.   
Given that CBAs are negotiated within highly contextualized environments rather than 
based upon standardized regulations, their strength – and thus their ability to reduce 
environmental health disparities – varies.  In order to understand the factors that influence CBA 
strength, nearly all of the extant literature draws its sample of cases from neighborhoods that are 
in the process of or have successfully completed a CBA negotiation. Yet no existing research has
examined the power dynamics that shape a community’s ability to compel the developer to 
negotiate in the first place.  This omission holds pragmatic, empirical, and theoretical 
implications.  First, pragmatically, groups that cannot have their issues placed on the policy-
making agenda are effectively blocked from bringing their issues to fruition (Cox & McCubbins,
2005). Empirically, by ignoring unsuccessful communities, evaluations of CBAs are likely to be 
positively biased. It seems logical that the same communities that cannot get to the negotiation 
table are also the least powerful and, potentially, the most vulnerable to environmental injustices.
Finally, in terms of the development of theory, the study of a “non-event” allows for the 
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examination of the ways in which power operates to reinforce inequality – in this case 
environmental inequality – by silencing or ignoring people and places that are often invisible.
In order to address this empirical gap, this study utilized a political ethnographic 
methodology to examine power dynamics within a Southwest Detroit community-based CBA 
campaign in which organizers and residents unsuccessfully mobilized to secure a CBA in 
exchange for hosting a new bridge and international border crossing. By entering the community 
at an earlier policy-making stage than existing studies of CBAs, I am able to demonstrate how 
political and economic inequality contribute to environmental inequality.
First, I demonstrated that Delray was chosen to host the new border crossing, in part, 
because its land was comparably affordable and it was comparably less politically powerful than 
most affluent areas that were also considered.  Thus, given that it was understood that the NITC 
would contribute to air pollution, truck traffic, and noise, thereby potentially provoking a 
NIMBY response, Delray’s economic divestment and political marginalization made it attractive 
to planners as a site of least resistance.
Second, I argue that the decision to pursue a CBA, as opposed to a NIMBY campaign, 
resulted from the belief that the community did not have sufficient power to successfully block 
the new crossing.  As a result, a NIMBY campaign was organized out of the political arena.  
Furthermore, not only did the CBC stakeholders believe that “there was no alternative,” meaning
that the NITC was coming and they needed to get the best deal possible; they also believed that 
“there was no alternative” for the neighborhood itself.  Delray began its decline in the 1930s, and
for decades lost population and city services – over time isolating its residents from the rest of 
the city and surrounding them with heavy industry.  Given that there was a perception that no 
alternative, healthy investment would be coming to the neighborhood, the NITC offered an 
undesirable option that was still viewed as being better than nothing.
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Finally, I identified three categories of political actors that, at times unintentionally, 
frustrated the Southwest CBA campaign.  These categories include: (1) groups that 
unconditionally opposed the proposed development; (2) groups that unconditionally supported 
the proposed development; and (3) groups that viewed the host community as a “competitor” in 
efforts to secure their own unique influence or investments.  By manipulating, tokenizing, and 
minimizing the host community’s concerns, these groups acted as gatekeepers, creating obstacles
to local efforts to secure the CBA.  
In sum, by examining three phases of the land use decision-making process, all of which 
occur prior to CBA negotiations, I conclude that CBAs involve a complex array of actors, 
beyond the previously emphasized binary relationship between a developer (or the growth 
regime) and the host community, because I revealed previously unexamined mechanisms 
through which environmental inequalities are reproduced at the local level.  
Alternatives: Accountable Development and Environmental Equity
Previous empirical work found that CBAs can advance the economic well-being of the 
host community (Baxamusa, 2008; Gross et al., 2002; Lucas-Darby, 2012; Parks & Warren, 
2009; Saito, 2012; Salkin & Lavine, 2007).  While, my findings do not contradict this body of 
work, they do call for caution in this interpretation.  A community benefits agreement can be an 
innovative way to secure local investment – when a community is able to access one.  However, 
because power is required to secure a CBA, this policy tool is out of reach for neighborhoods 
like Delray.
Rather than ending the story there, I want to pose some ideas about alternative 
approaches to prevent environmental injustice and promote equitable development.  First, I want 
to be clear that I do not think we should give up on local organizing or even, under some 
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conditions, CBA campaigns.  Almost all transformative social change and social justice work 
historically has been the product of organizing and mobilization of local communities 
(DeFilippis, Fisher, & Shragge, 2010).  Hopefully this study will inform future campaigns as 
residents, organizers, and their allies plan their strategies and seek out allies. 
However, at the same time, I want to be clear that in communities like Delray the fight to 
obtain a CBA is not fair.  If we do not acknowledge that fact, we may unintentionally blame 
communities like Delray for their failures.  This is not to say that the Southwest Detroit 
Community Benefits Coalition did not miss out on political opportunities, but I do not think that 
if they had just “pulled themselves up by their collective bootstraps” they would have a CBA 
today.  Therefore, in conjunction with local organizing, I would like to suggest the following 
policies as worth exploring if our goal is to systematically protect neighborhoods like Delray 
from becoming sacrifice zones.
What would Canada do?  
Given that the bridge lands in Delray as well as in a suburb of Windsor, perhaps the first 
place to look is to our northern neighbor.  (Although, in this case, Windsor is actually to the 
south of Detroit.)  
In Windsor, the residents, businesses, and faith institutions located near the new bridge 
have already been relocated. One of my research assistants was able to attend a meeting in 
Windsor, held by a group comparable to Delray’s Community Benefits Coalition.  The primary 
concern on the agenda that night was the safe relocation and protection of the wild grass near the 
bridge.  When the research assistant asked organizers about relocated businesses, she was told 
that they—as well as a relocated church—were pleased with their offers and found them to 
generous.   
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At the time of the writing of this dissertation, the Delray CBC has taken on the argument 
that the Canadian investments should be a model for comparable investments in Southwest 
Detroit.  As reported by the Detroit Free Press:
More than 300 acres of green space and recreational trails were added to the Herb Gray 
Parkway corridor to address quality of life concerns. In addition to a sound barrier, the 
green space and trails help protect residents from noise and pollution by creating 
distance from the traffic. (Guillen, 2015)
Time will tell if this will happen.
When my research team and I went to Windsor to interview Canadian Member of 
Parliament Brian Masse, who represents the impacted area as well as the neighborhood where 
the Ambassador Bridge lands, we asked him about his leverage in pushing for local investments. 
He told us: “Well, they took my leverage away because they gave me pretty well everything I 
asked for” (Masse, 2012). 
We asked why he thought the bridge-building process has been so much more favorable 
in Canada than in the United States, a difference that he emphasized had to do with campaign 
financing.  He told us that Canada – like the United States – previously had campaign rules that 
allowed lobbyists to contribute heavily to both liberals and conservatives, thus influencing the 
political agenda.  However, the rules changed and now there is a cap of $1,200 that can be 
donated to political campaigns.  As he told us:
Not to say that any particular politician was bought off but there was quite a close 
affiliation between the Ambassador Bridge and the Liberal Party…. Now you can give 
$1,200 to an electoral candidate and $1,200 to a party.  So you have a limited scope of 
influence in my opinion.  Because I noticed some of the work that you were doing that 
some American politicians were almost receiving, I think some were receiving a 
thousand dollars a month…. (Masse, 2012)2
2
When he says “some of the work that you were doing…”, M.P. Masse is referring to data 
that my research team and I collected to determine who the Moroun family was donating to, and 
how much they were giving.  This request was made by Delray residents.  They also asked us to 
find out what properties in Delray are owned by companies that Moroun controls. Our findings 
were presented at a CBC Town Hall Meeting in which Masse was invited as a guest speaker.
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Thus, M. P. Masse concluded that one reform could be to decrease the legal amount of political 
donations in the United States.  
Furthermore, he stated that Canada has implemented rules that limit the total amount of 
money that can be spent on campaigns.
We have caps on how much you can spend on electoral campaigns. It’s based on the 
population so mine is approximately – in Windsor West – is around $80,000.  So, and I 
represent about 130,000 people, 3/5 of the city of Windsor.  So if somebody can be 
bought off or influenced by $1,000 then you’re probably not in a thing.  Ya know, it’s… 
made it more difficult for influence elements on politicians (Masse, 2012).
All of these differences culminate in a different set of priorities for elected officials in the two 
countries.
I have to make sure that I raise funds… it’s part of what we have to do to get reelected …
but it doesn’t become like in Washington and Lansing where they have to become 
funding machines, it becomes a preoccupation… of the job.  And you can’t fault them… 
If you want to win, you need money.  My campaign, when I first got elected, we were, I 
was elected in 2002 and the party, the NDP was polling at 13%, nationally.  So we 
needed to make sure we had a fully funded campaign to compete.  It’s just a reality.  So 
that’s what’s happening, I think, in your situation (Masse, 2012).
Thus, he argues that the system of U.S. election rules creates incentives for politicians to be 
“funding machines,” thus prioritizing the interests of their donors (like the Ambassador Bridge 
Company) rather than the poor (like Delray residents).  Perhaps a donation system more similar 
to Canada’s would reduce the relationship between economic inequality and political inequality.
Health Impact Assessment
In addition to changing the “rules of the game” as they pertain to elections, public health 
advocates and environmental justice groups have pushed for policies that prioritize the health of 
residents of host communities. For example, some advocates call for a human health risk 
assessment.  
Health impact assessments (HIAs) have been conducted in Europe and Australia for 
many years. In recognition that many policies, plans, and projects… have important 
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health implications, groups in the United States have started to conduct HIAs in the last 
ten or so years to evaluate and support the consideration of health in decision making 
processes. Health impact assessment may be defined as “a combination of procedures, 
methods and tools that systematically judges the potential, and sometimes unintended, 
effects of a policy, plan, program or project on the health of a population and the 
distribution of those effects within the population”. (Larsen et al., 2014)
During my fieldwork, I observed community advocates joking that the NITC’s Environmental 
Impact Statement gives more attention to the health of fish in the Detroit River than to the health 
of residents.  
The Cumulative Measures of Contamination
Another reform could be to change how pollution and contamination are measured. 
Currently, there are limits to how much pollution a facility can emit. However, sacrifice zones 
frequently contain many contaminating facilities – and there are no limits to the cumulative 
emissions.  Further, this policy does not measure for synergism—or how chemicals interact with 
one another (Checker, 2005). If there were rules that limited cumulative pollution in 
concentrated areas, it is possible that the NITC would not land in Delray because the 
neighborhood is already so highly impacted.
Buffer Zones
Currently, in an effort to prevent eminent domain abuse, there are rules that the 
government can only purchase land that is needed for the footprint of a project.  Therefore, there 
are people in places like Delray who cannot be bought out – even if they live across the street 
from the new border plaza.  Thus, the CBC has always argued for the need for some buffer zone 
around the NITC.  They, like some public health advocates, argue that establishing buffer zones 
between residential developments and factories, major roadways, and other LULUs would limit 
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the incidence and severity of pollution-related ailments, such as asthma, impaired lung function 
and development, and cardiovascular disease.
As Delray has become more industrialized and less residential, the CBC has floated the 
idea of transforming all of Delray into a buffer zone.  In part, this is because of the recognition 
that the city plans to continue concentrating industry there, while reducing services to residents 
(Detroit Works Long Term Planning Steering Team, 2012). In the future, it is possible that the 
CBC will be able to negotiate to move everyone out, potentially by trading homes in Delray with
homes that the City owns through tax foreclosure.
Citywide Community Benefits Ordinance
In Detroit, a coalition has emerged to pursue a citywide ordinance requiring the 
negotiation of community benefits agreements whenever a large-scale development receives 
public land or tax incentives.  This would eliminate the need for local coalitions to convince a 
developer to negotiate with them – and allow the host community to leverage its power within 
the negotiation itself.
Although the citywide proposal has received support from some elected officials, the 
State legislature strongly opposes this law, and has tried to proactively pass legislation that 
would prohibit city governments from requiring CBA negotiations.  Furthermore, the Detroit 
Economic Growth Corporation opposes the bill (T. Walsh, 2014) and the Detroit News referred 
to it as a “Shakedown Tax” (Editorial, 2014).  The citywide campaign has since stalled.
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Change the System
Until there is equal enforcement of environmental legislation, the ability to negotiate or 
control development within host communities, and access to clear and honest information about 
toxins produced and health impacts, we will have environmental injustice (Austin & Schill, 
1991; Bryant, 1995). While changes to election and environmental law could help people who 
live in neighborhoods like Delray, there are prominent environmental justice advocates who 
suggest that “to truly prevent environmental justice, we need policies that eradicate poverty, 
racism, and disease; all other efforts are stopgaps” (Bryant, 1995; Dominelli, 2012)
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Figure 10.  What About Delray?  On the day that the bridge deal was signed, Delray residents 
stood out front of Cobo Hall with handmade signs like this one. (Source: Amy Krings)
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Figure 11. Delray is Our Home.  On the day of the bridge signing, CBC board member Debra 
Williams encouraged community members to stay involved and to stay hopeful.  She frequently 
quoted The Bible in community meetings, asking residents to stay committed.  She would tell 
them, “Stay informed, keep fighting, and maintain integrity.  And it can be hard to beg—but it is 
what it is. The Bible tells us, 'Be not weary in well doing: for in due season we shall reap, if we 
faint not.'”. (Source: Amy Krings)
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Figure 12. Keep Your Promises.  Leadership and members of the Southwest Detroit 
Community Benefits Coalition. (Source: Amy Krings)
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APPENDIX
The following is a selection of the people that I interviewed.  I am not including 
everyone, as some respondents are confidential.
CBC Board Members 
 Scott Brines 
 Alex Burke
 Pastor Kevin Casillas
 Tom Cervenak
 Michael Christopher
 Bill Teasley
 Debra Williams
The CBC lead organizer 
 Simone Sagovac
Southwest Detroit Community Stakeholders:
 Maria Finn
 Don Graham
 Mario Hernandez
 Vincent Martin
 John Nagy 
 Joe Rashid
 Frank Rodriguez
 Gregg Ward
Six of the seven members of the Michigan State Senate Economic Development Committee 
 Chair Mike Kowall (Rep)
 Vice Chair Dave Hildenbrand (Rep)
 Tupac Hunter (Dem)
 Virgil K. Smith (Dem)
 Mike Nofs (Rep)
 Geoff Hansen (Rep)
Elected Officials 
 Michigan Lieutenant Governor, Brian Calley (Rep) 
 Michigan State Senate Majority Leader Randy Richardville (Rep)
 Michigan State Senate Minority Leader Gretchen Whitmer (Dem)
 Delray’s State Representative Rashida Tlaib (Dem)
 Delray’s State Senator Coleman Young II  (Dem)
 Michigan State Senator Hoon-Yung Hopgood (Dem)
 Windsor’s Parliament Representative Brian Masse
Journalists and Bloggers
 Ed Arditti
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 Jack Lessenberry
 Joel Thurtell
Anti-NITC Activist
 The Michigan Director for Americans for Prosperity, Scott Hagerstrom
Pro-NITC Lobbyist 
 Tom Shields 
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